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For Release on Receipt: January 26, 1978
HEARINGS ON REGULATING ACCOUNTANTS ANNOUNCED

The need for mandatory federal regulation of certified public
accountants versus voluntary self-regulation by the accounting

profession will be probed during three days of Congressional hearings
that begin on Monday, January 30, 1978.
Rep. John E. Moss, Chairman of the House Commerce Subcommittee

on Oversight and Investigations, which will conduct the hearings, said

the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' recent proposals

for self-regulation will be extensively examined to determine whether
they can adequately protect the public, ensure the competence and
integrity of CPAs and promote competition in the profession.

Moss said: "There are over twenty-five million individual
investors in this country’s publicly-held corporations who rely

heavily on independent accountants to ensure that corporate financial

statements are accurate and truthful.

The investing public is painfully

aware of the recent reports of illegal payments and corporate slush
funds which were either kept off the corporate books, or artfully

concealed under the rubric of 'generally accepted accounting principles.'"
As we seek to restore the confidence of investors in the fairness of

the securities markets, the question now is whether the AICPA proposals

are capable of ensuring integrity and competition in the accounting
profession.

If we find they are not, I will not hesitate to introduce

the necessary legislation."

Scheduled witnesses for Monday, January 30, are: Honorable
Charles Percy, Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Subcommittee

on Reports, Accounting and Management; Mr. Stanley J. Scott, Chairman

of the Soard of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants;

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the AICPA's SEC Practice
Section; Mr. Don Neebes, Chairman of the Peer Review Committee of the
AICPA's SEC Practice Section; Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman of the

Public Oversight Board of the AICPA's SEC Practice Section; Mr. Ray

Garrett, member of the Public Oversight Board; and Mr. Harvey Kapnick,
Managing Partner of Arthur Andersen § Co., one of the "Big Eight"
accounting firms.

Witnesses for Tuesday, January 31, include: Mr. Eli Mason,
Managing Partner of Mason § Co., New York; Mr. Joseph Alam,
Managing Partner of Alam § Co., Detroit; Mr. Alan Brout, Managing

Partner of Brout § Co., New York; and Mr. Charles Kaiser, Managing

Partner of Harris, Kerr, Forster § Co. of Los Angeles.
On the third and final day of hearings, Wednesday, February 1,
the witnesses will be: Mr. Norman Auerbach, Chairman of Coopers §
Lybrand, one of the "Big Eight" accounting firms; Dr. John C. Burton,

Professor of Business at Columbia University; and Honorable Harold M.
Williams, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Press Release #36

Testimony
of
Senator Charles H. Percy

before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
January 30, 1978

As I begin my remarks today, I would like to pay tribute to the

late Senator Lee Metcalf.

Senator Metcalf was one of the most decent and

gentle men in the United States Senate.

He was a man who could think no

evil of others and always went out of his way to find the good in his
fellow man.

But Lee Metcalf was also a battler for those causes he thought were

right.

I have had the pleasure of serving for many years on the Senate

Governmental Affairs Committee with Senator Metcalf.

He has taken major

positive roles in the work of the Committee — creating the Congressional

Budget Act, protecting the rights of privacy of all Americans, and all the

energy reorganization work the Committee has done including the creation of

the new Department of Energy.
In recent years I worked most closely with him on his vigorous over

sight of the Federal Advisory Committee Act which resulted in the reduction

of several hundreds of Federal advisory committees.

The work of the present

administration in this regard is but an extension of the work Senator Metcalf
began several years ago.
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This past year: Senator Metcalf

focused his energy on the accounting

profession and began the first serious inquiry into the profession in decades.
The work Senator Metcalf has already done has led to a new spirit of self-

reform within the profession and to more active involvement by the Securities

and Exchange Commission.

I certainly intend to keep this work alive in the

committee and to follow through on Senator Metcalf’s initiative.

Today I would like to review the work of the Senate to date on the

accounting profession and to attempt to set the stage for your hearings.

The Reports, Accounting and Management Subcommittee staff began a

study of the profession in the fall of 1975 and issued a staff report in
January, 1977, entitled The Accounting Establishment.

That report made a

number of criticisms of the accounting profession and made a number of recom
mendations, generally calling for an increased Federal role in the accounting

profession.

The reaction of the profession to the staff report could charitably

be described as negative.
In April, May and June of last year the Subcommittee held eight days

of public hearings in which a broad range of witnesses appeared representing
many viewpoints about the profession.

The profession itself generally asked

that existing private organizations in the profession be allowed time, in
cooperation with the SEC, to work out reforms before Congress should consider

mandatory legislation.
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It was apparent during the hearings that the SEC and leaders in the
accounting profession recognize that meaningful reforms were needed in the
way they perform their responsibilities.

Members of the Subcommittee were

encouraged by pledges of timely action within the accounting profession to
achieve reform.

Therefore, in a unanimous report of the Subcommittee signed

by all five Senators in November, 1977, the Subcommittee agreed that the pro

fession itself should be allowed to take the lead in meeting the goals out
lined by the Committee in its report.

As the Committee report states, "Self

initiated action by the private sector in cooperation with the SEC is the

method of reform preferred by Subcommittee members."

However, the Subcommittee

went on immediately to say that "The Subcommittee recognizes Congressional
responsibility to continue oversight of this process, and to propose mandatory
reforms if meaningful progress is not made on a timely basis."

Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend the remainder of my time summarizing
what the Reports, Accounting and Management Subcommittee feels are needed re

forms within the accounting profession, hopefully to be achieved by self-initiated

actions by the profession itself but in any event necessary to achieve by what
ever means.

It is my hope that your Subcommittee in this set of hearings can

ascertain which, if any, of these goals have been achieved by the profession
and the SEC since the Senate Subcommittee hearings last summer.

In the area of accounting standards, the Subcommittee generally endorsed

the recommendations of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) Structure Com

mittees report.

These recommendations of the FAF Structure Committee included
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opening up meetings of the FASB, strengthening the organization of the FASB,
increasing involvement in the FASB from all segments of its broad constituency

and broadening the base of FASB financial support.

I am pleased that the FASB

has already moved to implement some of these recommendations including opening
up its meetings.

The Subcommittee also recommended that financial reports of publicly
owned corporations be made more understandable to the unsophisticated user

while still providing sufficient information for the sophisticated user.

The Subcommittee also recommended that uniformity in the development
and application of accounting standards must be a major goal of the FASB.

The

Subcommittee stated that it "Strongly believes that the clarity and compara
bility of corporate financial statements will be substantially inproved if

uniform accounting standards are used to report the same type of business trans
actions ."

In the area of auditing and auditing standards, the Subcommittee had

a number of recommendations.
Some of them include:
1)

A program of external quality review for accounting firms to be

performed at least every three years.

The reports of these peer reviews should

be submitted to the SEC and made available to the public.

The Subcommittee strongly
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feels that financial data and operating information of accounting firms should
be made public just as is such information of publicly owned corporations that

accounting firms audit.

2)

The Subcommittee strongly feels, as does Chairman Williams of the

SEC, that independent audit committees should be established in all publicly
owned corporations.

The Subcommittee feels that independent audit committees

composed of outside directors be a condition

outside auditor.

for being audited by an independent

If there is one single idea that the Subcommittee strongly

endorses it is this idea of independent audit committees composed of outside
directors.

And by "outside" we mean truly outside and divorced from any re

lationship with the corporation.

In this regard, we would feel that the New

York Stock Exchange rules allowing the corporation's banker

or the corporation's outside legal counsel to be on the audit committee is in

sufficient.

We feel that there is too direct a link between such parties as

these in the corporation and we do not consider them truly independent, outside

directors.
3)

In another major area, the Subcommittee recommends that independent

auditors of publicly owned corporations perform only services directly related

to accounting.

Non-accounting management services such as executive recruit

ment, marketing analysis, plant layout, product analysis, and actuarial services

are incompatible with the public responsibilities of independent auditors and

should be discontinued.
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4)

The Subcommittee feels that there should be stronger mandates to

independent auditors to report illegal activities.

Any illegal activities

uncovered by the auditor must be reported to the corporation’s audit committee
and the appropriate government authorities.

It is no

longer sufficient to

be concerned by illegal activities only if they have a material affect on the

financial statements of the corporation.

There should be an affirmative obli

gation of auditors to seek out material fraud and illegal or questionable acts.

5)

The Subcommittee also recommended that the accounting profession

should establish some sort of organization of accounting firms which serve as

independent auditors for publicly owned corporations.

To be effective, any

such organization must include all accounting firms which audit publicly owned

corporations and the organization must have the power to impose sanctions on
members which do not meet the organization’s performance and behavior standards.

The AICPA has already made a step in this direction in its annual meeting in
September of this past year.

Mr. Chairman, the other recommendations of the Senate Subcommittee are

spelled out in the report which the Subcommittee issued unanimously in November

of this past year.

It is my hope that your hearings can determine what progress

has been made toward these goals by the profession and the SEC since the hear

ings we conducted last summer.

To restate a point I made earlier, it is the

preference of the Senate Subcommittee that self-initiated action by the private

sector in cooperation with the SEC be the root of reform.

However, it is

mandatory upon us both in the House and Senate to maintain continuous oversight
over these activities.
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One of the major reasons that the Senate Subcommittee is willing

to let the profession take the initiative in self-regulation is that in
creasingly our Committee feels that there should be more de-regulation of

industries and professions.

As you knew, major efforts are currently be

ing made to de-regulate the airline industry.

Legislation is also pending

in the Senate, introduced by Senator Robert Byrd, Senator Ribicoff and me,
and in the House, introduced by Congressman John Anderson and Congresswoman

Jordan, to apply a sunset procedure to regulatory agencies.

Regulatory reform can mean the reduction of vast amounts of regula
tory efforts and paperwork.

Therefore, at the same time we are reducing

regulatory requirements in other areas, it seems only right to give the
accounting profession the opportunity to initiate reforms internally, be
fore imposing new government regulation.

Mr. Chairman, although it is unclear at this point who will assume

Senator Metcalf's duties as chairman of the Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment Subcommittee, I pledge to you and members of the accounting profession
my continuing interest and concern in this area.

It would be my hope that

the Senate Subcommittee would hold hearings this coming July after the SEC

has issued its first annual report on activities and progress in the account
ing profession.

I think that can be a continuing step in monitoring progress

in this most important field and I look forward to continuing cooperation
with you and your House colleagues on this most important matter.

TESTIMONY OF
STANLEY J. SCOTT

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

JANUARY 30, 1978

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Stanley J. Scott.

I am currently the

chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac

countants, an organization of 135,000 certified public ac
It is fair to say that this is the largest or

countants.

ganization of CPAs in the world and that a substantial per
centage of all CPAs in the United States are members of it.
This post, as I am sure you know, is a voluntary, unpaid one.
My gainful occupation is as managing partner of Alford, Meroney

& Company, a local accounting firm with offices in Texas and

New Mexico.

We have 31 partners and we audit 11 SEC reporting

companies.

Also with me today are Walter E. Hanson, Chairman
of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA sponsored Division
for CPA Firms, Mr. Hanson is also Chairman of Peat, Marwick

Mitchell & Company; Donald L. Neebes, Chairman of the Peer

Review Committee of the SEC Practice Section and also a partner
of Ernst & Ernst; and Wallace E. Olson, President and chief
staff officer of the AICPA.

Also in the audience is Glen Ingram, Jr., Chairman
of the Private Companies Practice Section Executive Committee.
Mr. Ingram is also the head of Glen Ingram & Co. and is avail

able to answer any questions about the operations of the section.

We regard the Private Companies Practice Section
as being equally important to the performance of the profession

-2-

as the SEC Practice Section even though its activities may
be less visible because it deals with serving companies which

are not publicly traded.

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman,

assisting smaller business enterprises is a critical factor

in maintaining a healthy and diversified economy..
The Private Practice Section is substantially

parallel to that of the SEC Practice Section but provides a

means for tailoring the requirements of practice to better fit
the needs of smaller companies and the smaller CPA firms

which serve them.

The balance of my formal comments are devoted prin
cipally to the profession's actions to improve the performance

of audits of companies required to file reports with the SEC.

The AICPA has submitted to this Subcommittee a

memorandum discussing the extensive measures which the In
stitute has taken in response to your constructive urgings,
Mr. Chairman, to those of the late Senator Metcalf and his

subcommittee, and those which we have received from many
quarters, including members of our profession and users of

financial information.

submission.

I will not repeat the detail of that

Rather I would in these brief remarks, address

some of the major concerns which I know you, Mr. Chairman,

have with respect to the ability of the profession to do,
without new legislation, what is necessary to assure the quality

of performance which the public may reasonably expect from

the accounting profession.
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The Wall Street Journal of January 11, 1978, pur
porting to quote members of your staff, stated well the funda

mental question before you — and the profession.

One of

your staff members was quoted as saying ’’The hearings later

this month are designed to probe 'whether or not self-regulatory
measures of the AICPA are adequate and have been enforced.'"

I will not question that in the past our capacity

to impose disciplinary sanctions has not been fully satisfactory
in the eyes of our critics.

In my estimation, several reasons

account for whatever failings exist with respect to the pro
fession's discipline and compliance.

First, only state boards

of accountancy have the power to bar accountants from their
practice of public accounting.

In addition, of course, the

SEC can bar accountants from practicing before it and it has
often exercised that authority.

The state boards' authority

is limited to action against individuals; generally, they can

not act against firms.

individuals.

Second, the Institute is composed of

Accounting today, at least as it relates to

publicly held companies, is practiced by firms.

Until re

cently we did not have the means to impose disciplinary actions
on firms since only individuals are members of the Institute.

Third, we have a concern to assure that effective discipline of firms
does not unfairly compromise the rights and protections of
individuals who, like all Americans,are entitled to due process

and fair trial.
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We have now developed a mechanism for bringing dis
ciplinary actions against firms through the establishment of
the Division for CPA Firms, which consists of two sections,
one concerned with firms having or wishing to prepare for an
SEC practice and the other concerned with firms and individuals
who serve privately held clients.

Through the SEC Practice

Section we are able for the first time to impose upon firms
that practice before the SEC, disclosure requirements, practice

requirements, peer review requirements, disciplinary procedures —

all in full view of the public and subject to the oversight
of an extraordinarily distinguished Public Oversight Board.

The names of the members who have thus far accepted appointment to
the Public Oversight Board, John J. McCloy, Ray Garrett and
William L. Cary, without further comment, justify the quality

of surveillance you and we may expect.
As you know, any firm may enroll in the SEC Practice
Section.

It has been suggested that the existence of the

section may be adverse to the interests of smaller firms.
is difficult to discern why this should be so.

It

Dues in the

section will be relatively small; a firm with 10 or 15 partners
will pay perhaps $100 or $150 a year.

Many small banks have

benefited over the years in being able to say, like their
larger brethern, that they provide the same FDIC protection

for depositors.

Smaller firms, like mine, will be able to ap

proach a greater parity with large firms by being able to

-5state that we are subject to the same continuing education,

peer review, disciplinary, filing and other requirements as

the very largest firms.
It is true, of course, that the demand for more

quality control and the procedures necessary to assure re

liable financial information do impose additional costs on

the profession.

Peer reviews, educational programs, and

other characteristics of the effort to upgrade audit work
all cost money.

The small firms seek no dispensation from

high quality requirements, but they realize that any program —
voluntary or governmentally mandated — has inherent in it

costs that must be absorbed.

Nevertheless smaller firms

will not be at a disadvantage because the cost involved in
their participation in the sections will, in our opinion,be
fair and reasonable.

In the past the size and international scope of many
publicly held companies

tain the large CPA firms.

have inevitably caused them to re

Over 72 percent of the companies re

porting to the SEC are audited by the 16 largest auditing firms.

This is not the consequence of unfair trade practices or im
proper conduct on the part of these firms; this is a conse
quence of the operation of the competitive process which you,

Mr. Chairman, have often defended with eloquence and fervor.

The large firms are tough competitors.
from my personal experience.

I know that full well

But I believe this to be a proper

result of the competitive process.
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The firms which audit approximately 75 percent of
the companies that file reports with the SEC have already

indicated their intention to associate with the SEC Practice
Section.

This is clear evidence that no governmental com

pulsion is necessary to bring about broad submission to the
disciplines which are going to be imposed by that section.

Comments have been made concerning the composition
of the executive committee of the SEC Practice Section.

As

now constituted, each firm having 30 or more SEC registered
clients has a place on the committee and five places are re
served for firms with a lesser number of such clients.

Thus,

firms with less than 30 SEC registered clients have almost
25 percent of the places on the executive committee.

Quite obviously, a firm with hundreds of the largest

SEC clients is going to have a far greater interest in matters

relating to such clients that a firm having one, two or five
such clients, and such a firm will be much more willing to

commit time and energy to the resolution of problems associated

with such audits than a firm having a small number of clients.
Is it not sensible then to reflect in a composition of the
executive committee this reality?

Furthermore, criticism of the composition of the

executive committee implies that in some way the interests of
small firm members in the quality of their work are different

from those of large firm members.

I suggest this demeans

the small firms which in my experience are as interested in
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sound practices, continuing education, strong discipline

and peer review as the large firms.

When it comes to the

soundness of auditing, the reliability of financial statements
and the desire for effective corporate accountability, small
firms and large firms have no differences.
Of greater importance than the composition of the

executive committee and the competitive impact among CPA
firms is the effectiveness of the Institute’s program for

additional self-regulation.

This must be considered in the context

of the number of existing restraints on the conduct of auditors.

Foremost among these is the SEC.

While some have criticized

the SEC’s failure to exercise to the full effectiveness its

powers over the accounting profession, the fact is that from
the viewpoint of the profession the Commission, particularly

in recent years, has been rigorous in its pursuit of wrong
doing in the profession.

The extent of the Commission’s ef

forts to govern accounting is seen in the number of accounting
series releases:

between 1933 and 1972, 133 releases were pub

lished; since then 104 have been issued.

In other words, 44

percent of all ASRs have been issued in the last five years.

Also, the SEC has brought 124 enforcement actions against ac
countants between January 1974 and May 1977.

Based on these

statistics we believe that the Commission has in recent years
been vigorous and attentive in regulating the accounting profession.
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But regardless of the past, SEC Chairman Williams

has in testimony before the late Senator Metcalf's subcommittee,

and in several speeches,promised even stronger effort by the
Commission in the exercise of its powers over the accounting
profession.

This determination has already manifested itself

in the steps the Commission is now taking to strengthen auditor

independence.

Among other measures, Chairman Williams has pro

mised to report annually to Congress on the accounting profession

and its performance.

Regardless of what one may think of the

SEC’s performance in the past, few would deny its activism now.

An additional restraint on the conduct of accountants
is civil liability.

The most dramatic example of this was the

recent judgment against a major accounting firm in excess of
$30 million.

No accountant, Mr. Chairman, is going to expose

himself to this kind of danger if there is any way to avoid
it.

There isn’t a major accounting firm in this country

that has not found itself in litigation concerning large
amounts of alleged damage.

As the volume of litigation

has swelled, so have liability premiums, imposing a heavy
load on all firms.

It is in this context that the Institute’s program

imposes another layer of discipline.

Under the scrutiny of a

Public Oversight Board that will be made up of five nationally
famed and universally respected persons, the Institute’s program

is arranged to assure the process is open and visible to the

-9fullest extent consistent with the protection of individual rights.

The members of this board will not jeopardize reputations they
have spent a lifetime building to protect an errant
from just reckoning.

to human nature.

auditor

To do so would be totally contrary

The Institute is placing no restraints on

the time these people spend on the affairs of the SEC Practice
Section.

While it is estimated each will spend a minimum of

35-40 days on the work of the Board — the equivalent of 1/6

of their working time — they may spend more if needed and
they will, as the SEC has demanded, be paid well for that

extra work.

In addition, they will have ample staff to assist

them in meeting their responsibilities.

We believe the Institute's new program will provide
an effective layer of additional regulation and when combined
with the existing restraints on auditors makes legislation

unnecessary.

The concern that the Institute's program will be
divisive of the profession is not a valid basis for substituting

legislation for the Institute's program.
Every legislative program which we have heard of would

draw a distinction between the SEC practice and the non-SEC

practice firms.

A program requiring either registration with

the SEC or mandatory enrollment in any NASD-like organization

clearly recognizes differences in practice within the profession —
one directly regulated by the government or a quasi-governmental

body, the other not so regulated.

-10There is no way to avoid the simple fact that

auditors of publicly-held companies have problems and re
sponsibilities different from those of auditors who confine their

practice to companies not having public shareholders.

The former are subject to SEC oversight and discipline; they
are subject to suit

by disgruntled shareholders; they are

answerable to shareholders.

The new Division for CPA Firms

recognizes this reality -- as it should.

However it minimizes

the impact of the differences because it contemplates that

many firms which do not have SEC clients would associate
with the SEC Practice Section as a means of gaining the benefits
that association might bring.

By contrast, it is hard to

imagine firms voluntarily placing themselves under a govern

mentally imposed regulatory system.

This is particularly true

of smaller firms which share with other small businesses an
even greater antipathy to governmental regulation than do larger

enterprises.
We have proposed in our submission that instead of

initiating legislation now, the Subcommittee, the Institute
and the Public Oversight Board, agree upon a procedure to per
mit timely monitoring by the Subcommittee of the program as

it develops.
Mr. Chairman, as your Congressional career reaches

its final year, you may take pride in the role you have played

-Il
in spurring the accounting profession to undertake reform
and in causing the SEC to reexamine its role.

We are confident

that the profession’s initiative to which you have contributed,

combined with the heightened sensitivity of the SEC which you
have caused, is creating a more effective system of governance

of the accounting profession which will be a credit to you,
the late Senator Metcalf, and all others who have played a role

in bringing it about.

TESTIMONY OF

WALTER E. HANSON

CHAIRMAN OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

BEFORE THE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

JANUARY 30, 1978

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to share my thoughts with you

and with the other members of this subcommittee.

I believe all partici

pants in this hearing share a common goal — to ensure that the American
public receives the highest quality services from the auditing profession
and that the profession is prepared to assume the additional responsibilities

many have been urging upon it.
As you know, I am here in my role as Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms sponsored by the

AICPA.

I would not have taken on this responsibility if I believed a

legislative alternative would better serve the public interest.

I believe

the SEC Practice Section’s self-regulatory mechanisms are strong, will be
effective, and can and will provide the assurance the American public

deserves that audits of public companies are conducted in conformity with
the highest standards of independence, competence, and integrity.
I have made a personal commitment to assure that the SEC Practice Section
is in operation and achieving its purposes as expeditiously as possible.
Because of the cooperation and support we have received from the profession

thus far, we are well along in meeting this objective.

There is, however,

too little time for me to describe at any length the progress we have made.

Instead I will focus my remarks on the elements of the SEC Practice
Section’s structure that convince me that it will effectively serve the

public interest.

The Public Oversight Board is the keystone of the SEC Practice Section —
the stone that holds the others in place.

I can assure you that those who

conceived the structure of the section had in mind, figuratively speaking,
the role of the keystone.

The Public Oversight Board therefore is authorized
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to investigate any matter pertaining to the SEC Practice Section, report
publicly on any such matter, and make recommendations to the Executive

Committee.

There is no limit on its oversight activities.

But the basis

of the power of the Public Oversight Board lies in the quality of the
persons who will serve on it and their access to public opinion.

So long

as the Public Oversight Board includes persons whose independence and
integrity are so unquestioned that they have the power, through public

statements of disapproval, to destroy the reputation of the section, the
Public Oversight Board will function as a keystone.

I believe that in

men like John J. McCloy, Ray Garrett, and William L. Cary, we have members

whose integrity and independence are not only nationally, but internationally,

respected.

I also believe that persons with this degree of public stature —

and the ability to influence public opinion — would not agree to serve on
the Public Oversight Board if the position were full time, requiring them

to sever all their other connections.

Even on a part-time basis, however,

members are expected to devote a substantial part of their time.

In addition,

of course, they can employ whatever professional staff they need to carry

out their function.

To be more explicit, if a Public Oversight Board composed of persons who

have earned the public trust openly condemns the functioning of the section,
the press, members of the Congress, and the SEC will not let the matter

rest until it is remedied.

I submit that those who have decided to serve

on the Board are held in such high esteem that public opinion would join

them if they expressed opposition to the conduct of the SEC Practice Section.

Although the initial membership of the Public Oversight Board will reassure
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the public about the operations of the SEC Practice Section, the continuation

of the Board’s effectiveness depends on a succession of Board members equally
committed to the public interest.

Therefore, it should be noted that the

Public Oversight Board’s freedom to oversee the operations of the Section
includes the freedom to make recommendations to enhance its own effectiveness,
including recommendations with respect to the appointment, tenure, and
succession of its members.

If, after reviewing its own operations, it

concludes that changes are needed in order to assure its continued effectiveness,

it can recommend those changes to the Executive Committee, and if the
Board believes there are threats to its continued effectiveness that are not

being appropriately remedied, it can make public that conviction.

There will be five members of the Public Oversight Board.

service is three years, but appointments are renewable.

The term of
The Public Oversight

Board is responsible to publish periodic reports on the results of its
oversight activities and to fully inform the SEC and Congress.
engage their own staff to assist in carrying out functions.

They will

Board members

may attend any meetings of the Executive Committee or any other activity

of the Section.
The Public Oversight Board provides assurance that the Section’s peer review

and regulatory system will be effective.

It will, both personally and

through its own staff, monitor and evaluate the activities of the Peer
Review Committee and specifically determine whether the Peer Review
Committee is following up remedial actions firms take as a result of the

reviews.
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I have long believed that peer reviews are an effective mechanism to ensure
that firms provide quality auditing services.

professional integrity of the reviewers.

They work because of the

In addition, a peer review is a

professional engagement, and the reviewing firm must be prepared to accept
full responsibility for the quality of its work, including the threat of
legal liability for substandard work.

Under these circumstances, there is

no motivation to bias the peer review in favor of the reviewed firm.
Nevertheless, I believe even those who fear biased reviewers will recognize

that the Public Oversight Board’s regular evaluation of all aspects of

the peer review system will assure that it achieves its goals.

In order to carry out its charge, the Peer Review Committee has been given
a number of specific functions.

It is responsible for administering reviews

of section members and for establishing standards for conducting and reporting

on the reviews.

It recommends as it sees fit sanctions and other disciplinary

measures to the Executive Committee, and it is required to consult from time
to time with the Public Oversight Board.

The Peer Review Committee has already had two meetings and has made its first
progress report to the Executive Committee.

Its initial objective is to

develop a program in time for member firms to have peer reviews in 1978.

In order to meet this objective the Committee has established six sub
committees and task forces:

The Planning Subcommittee will develop agendas for the Committee’s
meetings, monitor the progress of other subcommittees and of task

forces, and prepare progress reports for submission to the

Executive Committee and the Public Oversight Board.
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The Subcommittee on Administration of Regular Peer Reviews

will develop the administrative policies and procedures for

regular peer reviews, oversee the work of the Committee
staff responsible for administering regular peer reviews,

and ascertain that firms are taking appropriate corrective
action as a result of regular peer review.

In addition it

will consider the circumstances under which exceptions to

the mandatory partner rotation requirement might be granted

and the question of authorizing alternative procedures in
place of the required concurring review of the audit report
in situations where the size of the member firm prevents
fulfillment of this requirement.

The Subcommittee to Develop Guidelines for Performing Regular
Peer Reviews will not only develop such guidelines but also

consult with the Continuing Professional Education Division
with respect to developing training materials for peer reviews.
The other task forces and subcommittees are the Task Force

to Develop Policies and Procedures for Peer Review Committee

Oversight of Regular Peer Reviews, the Task Force to Develop
Policy Statement with Respect to Regular Peer Reviews Performed
by State Societies and Associations, and the Subcommittee to

Develop Standards for Performing and Reporting on Regular Peer
Reviews.
The Chairman of the Peer Review Committee has met with the Acting Chief

Accountant of the SEC (Mr. A. Clarence Sampson), and there are plans to

keep the SEC fully informed about the Committee’s activities.
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Although membership in the SEC Practice Section is voluntary, we expect

all firms engaged in SEC practice to join the section.

At last count,

442 firms auditing about 7,500 SEC registrants have applied for membership,
impressive numbers given the fact that the section is still in its

formative stages.
The basic requirements for membership in the SEC Practice Section are

briefly as follows:
(1)

The firm must adhere to the quality control standards

of the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee.
(2)

The firm must submit to peer reviews every three years
or at such other times as designated

(3)

by the Executive committee.

The firm’s professional personnel must each undertake at

least 40 hours of continuing professional education annually.

(4)

Audit partners on individual SEC engagements for a period of

five consecutive years must be replaced by new audit partners.
(5)

Audit reports of SEC registrants must be reviewed by a partner

other than the engagement partner and may not be issued without
the reviewer's concurrence.

(6)

Specified financial, organizational, and other information must
be filed with the Section annually.

(7)

Minimum amounts and types of liability insurance must be
maintained.

(8)

The firm may not perform management advisory services for SEC

audit clients if the services would create a loss of independence

for the purpose of expressing opinions on the client’s financial
statements;

are predominantly commercial in character and

inconsistent with the firm's professional status as certified
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public accountants; or are inconsistent with the firm’s
responsibilities to the public.

The Section has already

proscribed consulting in the areas of psychological testing,
public opinion polls, and merger and acquisition assistance
for a finder’s fee.

In addition, members may not perform

the non-financial-related aspects of former services provided
under the headings of marketing consulting and plant layout.

Moreover, the Executive Committee has on its agenda the review
of other criticized services to determine whether they should

be proscribed.
(9)

Member

firms must report annually to the Audit Committee or

Board of Directors (or its equivalent if the client is a

partnership) of each SEC audit client total fees obtained from
the client for management advisory services in the year under

audit and must describe in the report the types of such services.
(10)

Member firms must also report to the same groups mentioned
in (9) the nature of disagreements with management on financial

accounting and reporting matters and auditing procedures which,
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused the issuance
of a qualified opinion.

Voluntary membership is effective because the SEC Practice Section establishes
the highest professional credentials and qualifications for auditing SEC

registered companies.

Accounting firms, in their own interest, will wish to

assure themselves they are meeting these qualifications by joining the

Section.
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The SEC Practice Section has strong penalties for failure to adhere to
its requirements.

These range from admonishment to suspension or

expulsion from the Section, and include monetary fines.

More importantly,

however, they include corrective measures to remedy deficiencies in
practice.

The threat of these penalties will provide strong motivation

for compliance with the SEC Practice Section’s requirements.

For

instance, it will motivate firms to respond swiftly to recommendations

from peer review teams.
The SEC Practice Section is designed to represent the interests of all
member firms.

As discussed in Mr. Scott’s testimony, the firms with less

than 30 SEC clients are fairly represented on the Executive Committee,

with nearly 25 percent of the seats.

Also, the Section’s voting require

ments have been carefully arranged to prevent domination of the Section
by the largest eight accounting firms.

Membership applications indicate

that small firms recognize the intent and effectiveness of this design.
Of the 442 firms that have applied for membership in the SEC Practice
Section, approximately 375 have 0,1, or 2 SEC clients.

I am pleased but not surprised by this response.

I believe it is recognition

not only of adequate representation on the Executive Committee, but also of
the fact that large accounting firms are not a monolithic bloc.

For instance,

historical voting records indicate that the large accounting firms represented

on the Executive Committee will not vote as a bloc.

The written comments

and position papers submitted to the FASB by large accounting firms and

their testimony at last year’s hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on

Reports, Accounting and Management provide evidence that their opinions
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differ on professional issues.

For example, an analysis

of five key

statements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board shows that in no case
were the largest eight firms unanimous in their positions and on only 25

percent of the major issues did even a simple majority of the eight firms
take the same position.

Taken together, the fair representation of smaller firms on the Executive
Committee, the widespread interest in membership by smaller firms, and
the lack of monolithic voting patterns by the large firms demonstrate and
ensure that the interests of the smaller firms will be served by the SEC

Practice Section.

In addition, the Public Oversight Board will monitor

the activities of the Executive Committee, providing the public and the

smaller firms with the assurance of fair representation of all interests.

It is worth noting that firms that join the SEC Practice Section will
not, thereby, be subjected to higher standards of accounting, auditing,

quality control, and ethics.

These standards are the same for all firms

because they are set by boards and committees outside the SEC Practice

Section and apply to all AICPA members, whether their firms are members
of the SEC Practice Section, the Private Companies Practice Section, or
no section at all.

-

Accounting standards are set by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board,

Auditing standards are set by the Auditing Standards Executive
Committee,

For details, see testimony of Walter E. Hanson before the Senate Subcommittee
on Reports, Accounting, and Management, May 12, 1977.
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Quality control standards are set by the Quality Control
Standards Committee, and

Ethical standards are set by the Professional Ethics Executive
Committee.

The primary functions of the Executive Committee, and indeed the SEC

Practice Section, are to assure that member firms practicing before the
SEC meet these professional standards and to discipline those that do not.

In order that the position of the five representatives of the smaller

firms be put in full perspective, the following additional details of the
organization and responsibilities of the Executive Committee should be

borne in mind.

The Committee may not consist of fewer than 21 members, and terms
are for three years, with initial staggered terms to provide for

seven expirations each year.

Representatives are appointed by the

Chairman of the AICPA with the approval of the AICPA's Board of
Directors.

Nominations for appointment are made by a seven-member

nominating committee elected by the AICPA Council.

The chairman

of the Executive Committee is elected by the committee membership
and may not serve more than three one-year terms.

The Executive Committee establishes general policies for the
section, may amend the requirements for membership, establishes
budgets and dues requirements, and determines sanctions to be

imposed on member firms based upon the recommendations of the

Peer Review Committee.

In addition, the Executive Committee

is responsible for acting upon complaints received with respect

to actions by member firms.

It also selects persons to serve

on the Public Oversight Board and meets with the Board as requested.
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Finally, the Executive Committee is responsible to make recommendations

as it sees fit to other AICPA boards and committees for their considera
tion.
Thirteen members of the Executive Committee constitute a quorum

for the conduct of business.

Eleven affirmative votes are required

for action except in the following two cases.

Thirteen affirmative

votes must be cast in order to amend membership requirements and in

order to determine sanctions to be imposed on members.

As I

mentioned before, the large firms have not voted as a bloc in the
past, and are not expected to do so in the future.

Nevertheless, the

voting system is designed to prevent even the possibility of domina
tion by the eight largest accounting firms.

quorum

The thirteen member

prevents those eight firms from stopping committee action

by refusing to attend.

And because no more than thirteen votes

are required to carry any measure, a majority exclusive of the

eight largest firms has the power to take action the eight may oppose.

One of the advantages of the new AICPA structure is that it gives recognition

to long-standing differences in types of accounting practice.

Congress,

through the Securities Acts and the powers it gave to the SEC, has
recognized that publicly-held companies are to be treated differently from

As a practical matter, AICPA boards and committees have historically not
made important policy decisions without obtaining the votes, positive or
negative, of virtually all members. Thus the quorum requirement is
essentially a technicality.
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private companies.

The requirements for practice before the Commission

are different from those for private-company practice.

The public is better

served if the profession’s regulatory mechanisms can focus on the specific
needs of practice before the Commission, and private companies are better
served if the profession’s regulatory mechanisms can focus on their specific

needs and problems and relieve them of requirements that are not germane

to their practice.

I am certain that the ongoing affairs of the SEC Practice Section will be

influenced by the oversight efforts of the SEC.

Chairman Williams has

explicitly promised that the Commission will be vigilant and will include

an assessment of the profession in its annual report to Congress.

More

over, the history of the SEC’s relationship to the profession strongly

argues that the Commission will use its powers freely to influence the
SEC Practice Section.

The AICPA maintains regular communication with the staff of the SEC.

For

instance, the Committee on SEC Regulations meets regularly with the staff

of the Commission, and the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, which

sets auditing standards for the profession, benefits from a two-way exchange

of views with the Commission.
The Commission’s influence on the profession is also illustrated by the
steps it has taken to ensure auditor independence.

There is an independence

requirement in SEC Regulation S-X (Rule 2-01), and the Commission has
over the years devoted nine Accounting Series Releases to the subject, the
earliest issued in 1937 and the most recent a month and a half ago.

addition, Accounting Series Releases 165 and 194 prescribe disclosure

requirements designed to protect audit independence.

In
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The Commission also exercises a disciplinary force over SEC practitioners

through its enforcement proceedings, which can result in injunctive actions.

It has suspended and in some cases disqualified CPAs from SEC practice,
suspended firms from taking on registered companies as clients, and imposed
peer reviews and quality control improvements on firms.

In short, when

one examines the Commission’s powers and their exercise, it becomes clear

that the SEC has been, and will continue to be, significantly involved in
the regulation of the profession.
I would like to emphasize that the Division for Firms adds a layer of
regulation the profession formerly did not have.

It replaces nothing.

Thus the effectiveness of the profession's regulatory environment is
based on the interaction of both the previously developed and the recently

introduced mechanisms.
the regulatory process.

major role.

I have just described the SEC’s ongoing role in

The courts have played and will continue to play a

In addition, the AICPA’s self-regulatory mechanisms in

operation prior to the recent reforms will continue to operate.

For instance,

individual CPAs, including members of firms in the SEC Practice Section,

will be subject to discipline by the Ethics Committee, and all CPAs will
continue to be bound by the Code of Professional Ethics.

The point is not

the length of the list of regulatory mechanisms one could develop, but

the effectiveness of the regulatory environment.

I think with the addition

of the SEC Practice Section, the overall system of regulation will provide
the public with ample assurance with respect to the financial statements of
SEC registrants.

******
The public accounting profession has been self-regulatory from its
earliest days.

Enhancements in self-regulation have been a regular feature
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of the AICPA’s history.

As we prepare for the future, it is clear the

public expectations of CPAs have enormously increased.

Though the public

often forms its expectations without regard to costs, I believe that many

of their expectations are legitimate and must be met.
that it must step up to this increased responsibility.

The AICPA recognizes

I have just

described, very briefly, the far-reaching measures the SEC Practice Section
has taken to substantially increase its self-regulation of SEC Practice

firms.

These measures have been tremendously influenced by suggestions not

only from practitioners, but also the SEC, your subcommittee, the late

Senator Metcalf’s subcommittee, and others.

I am certain that the SEC

Practice Section, under the Public Oversight Board’s oversight, will
operate effectively to protect the public interest and that no other form

of regulation would better serve the public interest.

Statement of John J. McCloy before Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of House of Representatives
held on Monday, January 30, 1978 at 2 P.M., Room 2322
Raybum House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

I am a practicing lawyer, a member of the firm of

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy located at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York City and I have been admitted to the bar of the State of New

York since 1921.

I am also a member of the bar of the Supreme Court

of the United States.

I have been asked by officials of the American Institute

of Certified Public Accountants whether I would be prepared to act as

Chairman of a Public Oversight Board of the S.E.C. Practice Section of

the Institute's recently created Division of CPAFirms when such Board

is constituted in accordance with the Institute's Plan for increased

self regulation procedures.

I have been advised by such officials of the general
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nature of the duties and responsibilities of such Oversight Board and

I have advised them that subject to its creation and its proper constitution

I would be prepared to act as the Chairman of such Board. I believe

officials of the Institute have already testified before this Subcommittee

in regard to the general nature, duties and responsibilities of the Board

as well as proposals for increased self regulation.

I have had sustained experience in the general practice

of the law mainly in the corporate field extending over a large portion of

my life. Prior to the outbreak of World War II I had been a member of

the law firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, a predecessor

firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. After periods in government service

with the U.S. War Department as The Assistant Secretary of War during

the World War II period and with the International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development of the United Nations, sometimes known as the World
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Bank,as its President and as U.S. Military Governor and as U.S. High

Commissioner to the Federal Republic of Germany, I served for over 7

years as Chairman of the Board of The Chase Manhattan Bank in New

York City and its predecessor, The Chase National Bank.

I returned to

the active practice of law in 1961 and since that time have been engaged

in such practice with my present firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy

in New York.

I have served on a number of boards of American

corporations and institutions including the American Telephone & Telegraph

Company, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Allied Chemical

Corporation, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Squibb Corporation, Dreyfus

Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, The Ford Foundation

and the Rockefeller Foundation. I have also served on University and

College Boards of Trustees. I am Chairman Emeritus of the Board of

Trustees of Amherst College.
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I am not an accountant though I have been associated

with and have acted as a lawyer or an executive working in cooperation

with accountants in connection with many corporate and financial

transactions.

In the course of my career and practice I have had a number

of contacts with the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as with

other regulatory agencies of the U.S. Government.

The Public Oversight Board has not yet been fully

constituted but I understand it is to be composed of five individuals who

would be in a knowledgeable position to observe, evaluate and oversee

the work of the Institute's S.E.C. Practice Section as it conducts its

self regulatory functions. As it has been represented to me, the Board

would be authorized to report at its own discretion any information,

findings or recommendations based on its observance and oversight

of the Practice Section to the Executive Committee of the Section, the
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Securities and Exchange Commission, appropriate Congressional Committees

or to the public at large.

Though I am not in a position to devote all my time to the

office of Chairman of the Public Oversight Board, as I intend to continue

the practice of my profession, I would be prepared to apply my best

endeavors, together with the assistance of the other members of the

Board and a suitable staff, to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of

the position of Chairman of the Board as they are contemplated by the

Institute.

In this position I would seek to contribute along with my

colleagues to the justified maintenance of confidence on the part of the

investing public in the integrity and competence of the accounting

profession in this country.

STATEMENT BY HARVEY KAPNICK,
CHAIRMAN, ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
95th CONGRESS, 2nd SESSION
JANUARY 30, 1978

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee,

I am

grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today.
name is Harvey Kapnick.

My

I am Chairman and Chief Executive

of Arthur Andersen & Co., a worldwide organization of

accountants and auditors.
I have previously testified before the Senate
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the

Committee on Governmental Affairs on May 24, 1977 on the

subject under consideration in these hearings.

My views on

the reforms and corrective actions that the accounting
profession needs to adopt were set forth in my testimony

before the Senate Subcommittee and in a booklet which was
placed in the record at that time.*

I would appreciate

having that booklet placed in the record of these hearings.

My general views remain as I stated them last May.
Today,

I would like to comment on what has been done in the

last eight months and what needs to be done in the next

eight months.

*”The Public Interest In Public Accounting" (With Commentary
on the Metcalf and Moss Reports), Including Statement by
Harvey Kapnick--Arthur Andersen & Co.--May 1977.
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The Public Interest
The capital markets of the United States are
essential to the welfare of our society and to the operations
of the entire world economy.

If capital is to flow freely

and efficiently in our free-enterprise economy, the consumers
of financial information must continue to have full confidence

in the product they receive.

Independent auditors play a

crucial role in maintaining this public confidence.

The

integrity, independence, objectivity, and professional
quality of the work of auditors are critical to the success

of our American economic system.

Public concern about the performance of independent

auditors has been increasing, and I believe with some justi
fication.

If it is to serve the public interest the account

ing profession must reform itself to meet increasing

responsibilities and rising public expectations.

At the

same time, we must recognize that there are limits to the

responsibilities that can be reasonably imposed on independent
auditors.
While the accounting profession must continue to

redefine its role, I do not believe, as some critics suggest,

that public accounting will inevitably become a Federally

regulated activity.

Indeed,

I believe that federal regula

tion would destroy the character and,
usefulness of public accounting.
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ironically, the

Independence is essential to the auditor and to the
crucial audit function--independence both from the pressures

of clients and from the dictates of government.
a free,

By performing

independent, and yet intermediary role between private

enterprises and public markets, the auditor serves as a
bulwark of our unique system of capitalism.

Legislation can neither create nor guarantee the

accounting profession's independence -- quite to the contrary.

The only effective means of assuring the profession’s indepen

dence is its performance.

The profession must demonstrate,

in a clear and specific fashion, that its independence serves
the public interest.

This requires an increasing receptivity

to fresh ideas as well as willingness to accept valid
criticism and act on it.

Progress by the
Accounting Profession
Washington has criticized the accounting profession
and thus helped move it toward overdue reform.

There is no

question but that, as a result of the incentive provided by

your Subcommittee and the Senate Subcommittee, the profession
has taken corrective actions it would not otherwise have

taken.
When I testified before the Senate hearings last

May,

I suggested that the AICPA be given until its annual
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meeting in September 1977 to develop and adopt a comprehensive

plan for self-regulation.

profession,

To the dismay of some in my

I indicated that, if a plan could not be developed

within that time,

such a plan would never be developed.

The

issues were not new -- what was needed was a change in
attitude and a willingness to act.

The AICPA developed a self-regulatory plan with
unprecedented speed.

That plan was approved at the organiza

tion's annual meeting last September.

Steps were immediately

taken to implement the plan, and that process is continuing.

Representatives of the AICPA have summarized for you what

has been accomplished and what is planned for the future,

so

I will not repeat that information.

It is remarkable that the large and diverse account
ing profession has made such progress in so short a time.
Yet much remains to be done.

I have observed the accounting

profession for many years and have sometimes been disappointed

by its apparent unwillingness to do what seemed to be not
only in the public interest but also in the long-range

interest of the profession itself.
In recent months, however,

I have seen significant

evidence of a change in attitude and a willingness to act.
I sense a new desire on the part of leaders of the profession
to recognize the full dimensions of their public responsibil
ities and do what is needed to discharge them.
4

For the

first time, most of the accounting firms have indicated a
willingness to give up some of their autonomy in an effort

to develop a meaningful system of professional self-regulation.
I would like to emphasize that the regulation of a
profession,

such as the accounting profession -- whether

done by the profession Itself or by the government -- is

vastly different from the regulation of business enterprises.
This is particularly true with respect to the public account

ing profession, which has a unique type of third-party

responsibility and a vast array of professional standards.
I believe that the profession has earned the right

to demonstrate whether it has the willingness, ability and

determination to carry through with the present plans.

Since the AICPA successfully worked against a deadline for

the development of its plan, I would suggest that the AICPA

again be challenged to work against a deadline -- its annual
meeting in October 1978 -- to achieve basic implementation

of the plan.

If it has the will, the profession can meet

that schedule.
I believe that the profession will succeed in

achieving effective self-regulation because three new

developments will build up increasing pressure for change.
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First,

the Public Oversight Board of the new SEC

Practice Section of the AICPA will be reviewing the public

interest role of the profession and determining what is
needed to meet that public interest.

Second, the Chairman of the SEC has promised to
make an annual report to the Congress, beginning July 1,

1978, which would review and analyze the progress of the

profession and the Commission in meeting their responsibil
ities.

This is a constructive step which I endorse.
Third, as this hearing shows, there is a new

awareness by the Congress.

Periodic oversight by this

Subcommittee and other Subcommittees will highlight areas

which need to be considered.

Thus,

for the first time in

the history of our profession, we have the appropriate

structure to keep pace with our changing role.

I would like to briefly discuss what needs to be
accomplished over the next eight months to bring about

effective self-regulation by the profession.
What Needs to be Accomplished
Over the Next Eight Months

With respect to the AICPA Division of CPA Firms,
I will discuss the SEC Practice Section more than the

Private Companies Practice Section, not because the former

is more important, but only because it relates to the
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auditors of publicly owned companies which are covered by
the Securities Acts and the jurisdiction of the SEC.

Certain provisions of the plan for the SEC Practice

Section,

such as those relating to second-partner review of

audits, the rotation of audit partners,

the requirements for

continuing professional education, and the establishment of

quality control standards, can be implemented within a
reasonably short period of time.

There are, however, other key elements of the plan
that are crucial to its success.

1.

These elements are:

Complete the appointment and organization of the

Public Oversight Board, with adequate staff, and
have that Board begin operations.

2.

Establish the peer review program, as contemplated

by the plan, and study alternative approaches that
could be used in making the program more reliable.

3.

Deal with questions relating to scope of practice
of accounting firms and establish restrictions
based upon the public interest.

4.

Reconsider the need for a requirement that account

ing firms publish financial information on an
annual basis.

This should include disclosure of
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the way in which international firms are organized

and financed.

5.

Establish disciplinary machinery that can operate
on a timely basis and without impairing the legal

rights of firms and individuals.
6.

Decide whether the profession can require audit
committees as a condition of auditing a publicly
held company.
While various matters are being considered in

the Private Companies Practice Section, and while steps are
being taken in other areas of the operations of the AICPA,

I believe an appropriate disposition of these six items will

be a test of the success or failure of the program.

I am

confident these objectives can be accomplished, and we should
know whether the profession is willing to regulate itself

by October 1978.
Some small firms are objecting to the SEC Practice
Section on the ground that the prospective cost would be an

undue burden.

They are concerned about the cost of establish

ing quality control standards, peer review,

continuing

While I am sympathetic to the

professional education, etc.

problems faced by small firms, I believe that, if such

firms elect to audit publicly owned companies, the investors
in those companies have a right to expect the accounting
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firms involved, regardless of their size, to meet proper
professional standards and to do the quality of work contem
plated by the requirements of the SEC Practice Section.

The litigation recently initiated by small firms
to delay the implementation of the program should not be

permitted to halt progress toward necessary reforms.

The

public interest is too important to tolerate prolonged

delay.
Various alternative methods of organization were

considered before the present structure was adopted.

A

primary reason for adopting this structure was to attempt to
fulfill our professional responsibilities to the public

within the existing national professional organization (the
AICPA) and thus keep a common "umbrella" over smaller firms

to facilitate their growth,

training and development.

If,

however, this approach is threatened with prolonged delay
arising from the present litigation, we are quite willing to
join with others in the profession to establish another
independent but comparable organization restricted to firms
auditing publicly held companies.

Indeed, during the period

of litigation, it would be prudent for such an alternative

organizational concept to be developed.

Thus, if a separate

organization becomes necessary, no time would be lost in

making the reforms needed to protect the public interest.
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Our Firm Has Voluntarily
Taken Certain Actions
Arthur Andersen & Co. has voluntarily taken steps

to better serve the public interest in many ways.

We have

issued annual reports for the last five fiscal years.
reports have included financial statements.

These

For our last

fiscal year, these financial statements were audited by
another accounting firm.
For more than three years, we have also had a

Public Review Board whose members are prominent persons with
experience in the business, government, academic and profes
sional communities.

This Board conducts an independent

review of the operations of our worldwide organization on a

continuing basis, including the management and financing of

the firm, the scope of our professional practice, and the
control of the quality of our work.

The results of this

review are reported annually to the public.

In 1977, we had a peer review of our audit practice

on a worldwide basis by another accounting firm.

That firm

reported the results to the Public Review Board and to our

partners.

The opinion of that firm with respect to our

quality control procedures was included in our annual report.

We have voluntarily limited our firm's scope of
practice to auditing, accounting,

taxes, and administrative

services, including the design and installation of systems
10

(such as computer-based systems and procedures) and the

performance of studies related to accounting, general record

keeping, and control processes.

We firmly believe that the

knowledge and experience we acquire through our work in pro

viding administrative services greatly enhance our effective

ness as independent auditors.

Moreover our combined skills

and knowledge have a synergistic effect, resulting not only
in better systems and controls to support the accounting

process but also in audits of higher quality and lower cost.
Accounting-oriented services are an essential part of the
independent auditors' role and should be retained as appro

priate areas for practice.
Further Comments
On Several Issues

Now, permit me to comment briefly on several other

issues facing the accounting profession.

Accounting standards.

The Financial Accounting

Standards Board--with a new chairman and three new Board

members, and with several significant changes in its policies
and procedures--is entering a new stage of development and

evolution.

While I have criticized certain aspects of the

FASB operations in the past, I fully support the FASB and
believe it now has a new opportunity to be successful in

carrying out its mission.
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Auditing standards.

The accounting profession has

been doing a steadily improving job of establishing auditing
standards.

To the best of my knowledge, most of the publicized

cases involving alleged fraud have not revealed any deficiency
in auditing standards.

These cases have generally represented

a failure to apply properly the existing standards.
Governmental imposition of auditing standards'

would be unwise and unnecessary.

counterproductive.

It would,

in fact, be

Standards and procedures laid down by

government decree would amount to a strait-jacket.

This

would inevitably inhibit the development of improved auditing

techniques and methods.

Government-enforced rules would

tend to become minimum standards and would result in the

deterioration of auditing quality rather than its improvement.
If the accounting profession is to be held responsible

for its auditing performance, it should have the authority

to establish its general standards and guidelines through
Auditing firms then have the

its professional organization.

clear responsibility for professional performance that meets

those standards.
Ethical standards.

The rules of professional

conduct should be reviewed to determine which can be demonstrated
to be in the public interest and which cannot.
should be eliminated.

The latter

Examples of rules that are being

critically reconsidered are those against advertising,
12

solicitation,

encroachment, and offering employment to an

employee of another accounting firm without first informing

Small firms may suffer more from these restrictive

that firm.

rules than do large firms.

Arthur Andersen & Co. believes

competition for clients and personnel serves the. public
Over the years,

interest.

some in the profession have

argued that restrictions on various types of competition

would improve the quality of performance.

I believe this

viewpoint is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible,
to sustain.

The most valuable asset of Arthur Andersen & Co.
is the firm’s good name and reputation, which we work to
protect and enhance every day.

Our awareness of this reality

serves as a powerful incentive to self-discipline in maintaining

the highest quality of performance.
In the area of professional discipline, the AICPA

must determine how it can become more effective.

However,

quite apart from professional sanctions it should be noted
that lawsuits, SEC enforcement actions, high liability

insurance premiums, and adverse publicity are powerful
incentives for accounting firms to provide a high quality of

service.

Professional discipline is a difficult issue,

since the legal rights of individuals are involved.

A

professional group cannot take away an individual’s livelihood
without the full panoply of constitutional protection.
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Although all of us recognize the need for reform in this

area,

it is very complex from a legal point of view.

fore,

this is an area that the Public Oversight Board should

There

consider carefully and suggest how best to proceed.

Maintaining a viable accounting profession with
firms of various sizes.

Our firm has long taken the position

that the accounting profession should be made up of a wide
range of types and sizes of qualified accounting firms to

serve the hundreds of thousands of business, nonprofit and
governmental entities throughout the country.

We have

assisted smaller firms in various ways when they have asked
us to help them.

On the other hand, there is a need for

healthy and constructive competition whereby professionals

who do the best work are rewarded by success.
The continuation or establishment of artificial

barriers to protect accounting firms from competition does
not serve the public interest and only tends to reward the

less efficient and less qualified.

What is needed, as has

been pointed out by the Public Review Board of our firm,

is

to find ways to assist accounting firms, particularly the

smaller ones,

in maintaining their qualifications and

efficiency so that they can compete successfully in their
own way and in their own area of practice.
Toward this end,

our firm has recently made a

$75,000 grant to the Paton Accounting Center at The University
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of Michigan for research to identify the actions needed to

assure the existence of public accounting firms of varying
sizes and characteristics.

Consideration will be given to

the roles that the larger firms, the AICPA,

the universities

and colleges, and other existing or potential organizations

might play.
International operations of larger accounting

firms.

One important issue has not received adequate atten

tion by the accounting profession or by the SEC;

it is the

issue of accountability within an international framework.
How do accounting firms control the auditing of the financial

statements of subsidiaries that are Included in the consoli

dated financial statements of U.S. parent companies upon
which the auditors report?

A peer review of only U.S.

offices is not adequate for an accounting firm when significant
audit work for U.S.

clients is done on subsidiaries outside

the United States.

The neglected question of firm structure needs

to be studied.

The critical issues of professional account

ability and independence depend on whether an international
firm's declared standards can actually be enforced and made

effective.

And this in turn depends on the firm's organiza

tional structure and degree of managerial and financial
integration.
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A wide variety of arrangements and affiliations
exist in foreign countries among accounting firms, with
considerably different degrees of control and review of the
work performed outside the United States.

Alternative

approaches may be appropriate, but disclosure of how firms
are structured, managed and financed is essential for the
information of clients and for the public interest that is
being served.

Our firm has a worldwide organization which adheres
to uniform standards and objectives of professional leadership

and client service.

While complying with the laws, regulations

and professional ethics of each country in which we practice,
Arthur Andersen & Co.
character.

is truly transnational in structure and

We have a large worldwide headquarters organiza

tion to coordinate the activities of our national entities

to ensure compliance with such standards.

In addition,

all

members of the worldwide organization are financially and

economically integrated to assure our independence.
In those few instances of countries where we cannot
legally practice, we have arrangements with local firms.

With respect to such local firms, we seek agreement on the
standards to be followed, and we make reviews of their work.
However,

since we have no management relationship or financial

integration with those firms, they are not represented as
being part of our worldwide organization.
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Audit Committees
A strong board of directors, with an audit committee

composed of independent outside directors, is essential in
today’s corporate environment.

There is a trend toward the

establishment of audit committees for publicly owned companies.
Domestic companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
will be required to have audit committees by mid-1978.
For some time, our firm has believed that all pub

licly owned companies should have audit committees composed
of outside directors.

We published a booklet in 1972 covering

the functions of such committees.
In my testimony before the Senate Subcommittee,

I

suggested that the AICPA should promulgate a professional

That standard would require, as a condition for

standard.

accepting an audit engagement for a publicly owned company,

that the company establish an audit committee of outside
We believe this approach would be more successful

directors.

than a Federal law or regulation requiring audit committees.
Such Federal requirements would inevitably lead to further
laws and regulations concerning the duties and responsibilities

of directors and other corporate matters.

The AICPA has appointed a special committee to study
ways to establish a professional standard concerning audit

committees.
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Limited Liability
In recent years, the burden of litigation on inde

pendent auditors has grown enormously, along with a vast
increase in class action lawsuits, some of which have little,

if any, merit.

There is debate about the desirability of

setting limitations on the liability of independent auditors.

The solution to this problem lies in clarification of the
criteria for determining the legal liability of auditors.
This hopefully will come from a reasonable evolution of court

decisions.
Some leaders of the accounting profession have been

tempted to seriously consider the voluntary acceptance of
Federal government regulation of the accounting profession

in exchange for limitations on auditors’ liability.
gorically reject any such "deal.”

I cate

Such a move cannot be

justified as being in the public interest.

Conclusion
In conclusion,

I believe the accounting profession

has made considerable progress in the last year.

I am confi

dent that the present momentum will be maintained and more
progress will be made.

The Congress has performed a valuable

service -- both to the public and the profession -- by putting

the spotlight on needed reforms and changes.

proud to say,

So far,

I am

the profession is responding to the challenge

of change.
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Mr. Chairman, Members

My

of the

Eli Mason - I

name is

Subcommittee:
appreciate this opportunity

to appear before you this morning.

My

professional quali

fications INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

I AM A FORMER. VICE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
of

Certified Public Accountants

Executive Committee (now

the

and a former member of its

Board

of

Directors).

I HAVE SERVED ON THE COUNCIL OF THE AICPA FOR NINE YEARS
AND WAS ELECTED ON THREE OCCASIONS.

I AM A FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY
of

Certified Public Accountants,

the largest of the

State

over 22,000 members.

Societies with

I am a member of the New York State Board for Public

Accountancy,

the official state examining and licensing

authority.

I am Chairman of the Board of Advisors of Baruch College,

City University of New York, one of the largest schools of
business in the

United States.

I am Vice Chairman of CPA Associates, an association of
37 INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTING FIRMS WITH OFFICES IN OVER 50

United States

and foreign cities.
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I AM MANAGING PARTNER OF MASON & COMPANY/ AN ACCOUNTING
FIRM BASED IN NEW YORK CITY.

Mr. Chairman, during July 1975,

an article which I wrote

ENTITLED, "A PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING OUR PROFESSION" WAS
PUBLISHED IN THE CPA JOURNAL.

THE OPENING SENTENCE WAS,

"The public accounting profession in
in need of a vast restructuring."

the

United States is

Subsequent

events have

proven the validity of that statement.

The thrust

of the article was that the proliferation

of authorities, rules and regulations created an accounting

structure that was obsolete, inefficient and duplicative.

The

situation is aggravated by the existence of 54 state

BOARDS OF ACCOUNTANCY WHICH OPERATE UNDER DIVERSE STATE

STATUTES, HAVE DIFFERENT POWERS, DIFFERENT TERMS OF OFFICE
AND PROMULGATE DIFFERENT RULES AND STANDARDS.

The

practice of public accountancy is not a provincial

VOCATION; RATHER, IT IS A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRO

FESSION.

Many,

if not the vast majority of practicing pub

lic accountants, deal with rules and regulations promulgated

Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Defense Department, Department of Labor, etc.
by the

In other words, most

of us who practice public

accountancy are practicing on the national scene.
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In my

article, and subsequently, I ADVOCATED a national

CPA CERTIFICATE WHICH WOULD PERMIT A CPA TO PRACTICE IN

ANY STATE, TERRITORY OR SUBDIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES

WITHOUT ARTIFICIAL WORK PERMITS, RECIPROCAL CERTIFICATES,
AND INDEED, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE FOR PRAC
TICING IN A STATE WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY.

Mr. Chairman, I have

been advised by eminent legal

COUNSEL THAT THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE

United States Constitution

is pervasive and, with respect

TO THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY, WOULD PREVAIL OVER

THE POLICE POWER PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

I THOUGHT

THEN AND I THINK NOW THAT MY PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL CPA
CERTIFICATE WAS A FINE IDEA - BUT THE HIERARCHY OF THE

PROFESSION OPPOSED MY PLAN.

I WONDER WHY!

DOES THE ESTAB

LISHMENT PREFER THE PRESENT DIFFUSED STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH

RESULTS IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY BY THOSE WHO

HAVE THE TIME AND RESOURCES?

Mr. Chairman, I

now turn to the matter of practice by

PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM
MISSION.

AS YOU KNOW, THOSE OF US WHO PRACTICE BEFORE THE

Internal Revenue Service
in

Circular 230

must meet requirements as set forth

of the U.S.

Treasury Department.

However,

I KNOW OF NO SPECIFIC REGULATIONS WHICH SET FORTH QUALIFI
CATIONS FOR PRACTICE BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE
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Securities

and

Exchange Commission,

It is conceivable

that an unlicensed person who terms

HIMSELF A "PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT", AND WHO MAY HAVE LITTLE OR

NO EDUCATION, TRAINING, OR EXPERIENCE (AND THIS IS AND HAS
BEEN POSSIBLE IN SO-CALLED "PERMISSIVE" STATES) COULD PRAC

TICE BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

Mr. Chairman, I urge
United States

that the

Congress of the

enact legislation which would provide for

registration of public accountants to practice before the

Securities

and

Exchange Commission.

I recommend that the

legislation spell out the authorities of the SEC as to

AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRAC

TICE AS A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT BEFORE THE SEC AND RULES OF
CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
WHO PRACTICE BEFORE THE SEC.

Mr. Chairman, as I am sure you know, there is no

ques

tion THAT THE SEC PRESENTLY HAS THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE

AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS

AGAINST ACCOUNTING FIRMS.

I KNOW THAT WHEN THIS FACT IS

REITERATED IT SENDS SHIVERS UP SOME SPINES - BUT IT IS TRUE,

ABSOLUTELY TRUE.

Why

do I advocate federal legislation to register public

ACCOUNTANTS WHO PRACTICE BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
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I do so for the following reasons:

Commission?
1.

Some state laws inhibit free

and democratic practice

BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

Commission.
For example, if a Massachusetts CPA is

retained by a

PUBLIC CORPORATION WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED AND OPERATES IN
the

State

of

Connecticut, he cannot freely perform

the audit

OF THE REGISTRANT IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT ON A CONTIN

UING BASIS.

If HE DID CONDUCT THE AUDIT, AS A MASSACHUSETTS

CPA, HE COULD BE FINED UP TO $500 AND IMPRISONED FOR NO
MORE THAN ONE YEAR.
IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT A LICENSED CPA CANNOT AUDIT ANY

PUBLICLY-HELD CORPORATION ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES.

There

are a myriad of divergent state rules for reciprocity,

ENDORSEMENT, WORK PERMITS, ETC., WHICH IMPEDE THE FREE PRAC
TICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY ON A NATIONAL SCALE BEFORE THE

Securities
The

and

Exchange Commission.

impact of such restrictive barriers has an obvious

detrimental effect on smaller and medium-sized accounting

FIRMS WHICH CANNOT MAINTAIN OFFICES IN MANY STATES.

Another interesting restriction

which may involve prac

tice BEFORE THE SEC IN MUNICIPAL AUDITS IS A REQUIREMENT IN

AT LEAST ONE STATE THAT ONLY A REGISTERED MUNICIPAL AcCOUN-
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TANT COULD AUDIT A MUNICIPALITY.

COUNTANT who is not a

A CERTIFIED PUBLIC AC

Registered Municipal Accountant

can

not LEGALLY AUDIT A MUNICIPALITY IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

Imagine,

if you will, the confusion that might arise

IN SUCH A STATE IF THE SEC WERE TO SET FORTH RULES AND RE
QUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL AUDITS.

2.

A SECOND AND FUNDAMENTAL REASON FOR DESIRING FEDERAL

LEGISLATION FOR PRACTICE BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE

SEC IS THE TRADITIONAL RECORD OF EVENHANDEDNESS BY THE STAFF
OF THE SEC, AND IN PARTICULAR, THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Accountant.

For

years, smaller and medium-sized accounting

FIRMS HAVE VISITED AND CONFERRED WITH THE STAFFS OF THE

Chief Accountant

of the SEC and they have received a warm

WELCOME, GRACIOUS COOPERATION AND COUNSEL.

THIS POLICY IS

TO BE CONTRASTED WITH THE RECORD OF THE PROFESSION ITSELF,

WHERE DISPLACEMENT OF LOYAL LOCAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS, WHEN

THEIR CLIENTS "GO PUBLIC", HAS BEEN THE RULE, RATHER THAN
THE EXCEPTION.

One

need only consider that 94% of the corporations

LISTED ON THE

New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE ARE AUDITED BY 8 FIRMS

TO KNOW THAT THE TREND IS IN ONE DIRECTION.

RECENT NEWS

PAPER ACCOUNTS OF CHANGES IN AUDITORS INDICATE THAT BIG 8
FIRMS USUALLY LOSE IMPORTANT CLIENTS TO OTHER BIG 8 FIRMS.
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However,

the next tier of accounting firms usually lose

THEIR CLIENTS TO BIG 8 FIRMS - WITH NO EVEN EXCHANGE.

In

other words,

Mr. Chairman, I

think that the majority

OF ACCOUNTING FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER AN

EVEN BREAK FROM THE SEC COMPARED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION

SPAWNED OVER THE YEARS BY THE PROFESSION'S INSTITUTIONS.

3.

On September 17, 1977,

the

Council

American

of the

Institute of Certified Public Accountants approved a Division
of

Firms with an SEC Companies Practice Section

Companies Practice Section.
cluding two former AICPA
current AICPA

Private

18 members from 11 states in

Vice Presidents, four

Council members

and a

past and

and managing partners of me

dium-sized AND REGIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS COMMENCED A PRO

CEEDING in

New York State Supreme Court

claiming that the

INSTITUTION OF A DIVISION OF FIRMS WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE IT

DID NOT CONFORM TO THE BYLAWS OF THE AICPA AND REQUIRED
APPROVAL OF THE MEMBERSHIP BY A MAIL BALLOT.

Aside

from the legal issue involved, those of us who

OBJECT TO THE DIVISION OF FIRMS WITH TWO SECTIONS HAD CER

TAIN SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS.

First,

the guidelines of each section provide for an

Executive Committee.

Practice Section,

In

the case of the SEC

Companies

all accounting firms with over 30 publicly-
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HELD CLIENTS (12G), ARE AUTOMATICALLY ON THE EXECUTIVE

Committee.

Mr. Chairman, there

Executive Committee,

United States.

are 21 firms on the

of which 16 are the largest in the

What chance would a smaller

or medium-

sized FIRM HAVE TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL IMPACT ON SUCH AN

Executive Committee?
the guidelines also provide for stan

Mr. Chairman,

dards of peer review and mandatory continuing education.

I CANNOT EXPRESS AN OPINION THAT WOULD APPROACH YOUR
INCISIVE EVALUATION OF CERTAIN PEER REVIEWS THAT ARE DEEMED
ACCEPTABLE.

Another cosmetic

element that the AICPA espouses is

MANDATORY CONTINUING EDUCATION.

THE INSTITUTE HAS ADOPTED

A POLICY OF 40 HOURS PER ANNUM OF REQUIRED CONTINUING ED
UCATION FOR RELICENSURE OF A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT.

Mr. Chairman

and

Members of

the

Subcommittee,

you have

BEFORE YOU AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN AICPA SPONSORED CONTINUING
EDUCATION COURSE ENTITLED "MANAGEMENT FOR RESULTS."

By

ATTENDING THIS SEMINAR, ON THIS IMPORTANT ACCOUNTING TOPIC,
AT SUCH GREAT CENTERS OF LEARNING AS LAKE TAHOE, VAIL,

Hyannis

and

Miami,

one can fulfill the annual AICPA contin

uing EDUCATION REQUIREMENT.

INCIDENTALLY, NEITHER OF THE

INSTRUCTORS IS AN ACCOUNTANT!
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addition,

In

Mr. Chairman,

there are many AICPA members

WHO BELIEVE THAT THE DIVISION OF FIRMS SETS UP A TWO-CLASS
OF COURSE, IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT ANYONE CAN JOIN

SYSTEM.
the SEC

Companies Practice Section,

but

Mr. Chairman, who

WANTS TO PLAY THE GAME IF NO ONE WILL EVER THROW YOU THE

BALL?

Mr. Chairman,

we believe that the new

Division of Firms

SETS UP AN ELITIST CLASS, WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MANY
MEMBERS OF THE AICPA.

It IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE BIG 8

FIRMS INSIST ON SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND AUTHORITY.

INDEED,

IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT THE BIG 8 HAVE A "DE FACTO VETO"

OVER ACTIONS OF THE AICPA.

If THAT BE THE CASE, Mr. CHAIRMAN

WE PREFER THE FUTURE PROSPECT OF REGULATION BY THE SEC TO
THE PAST RECORD OF THE AICPA.

In

the final analysis.

Congress

and the SEC must assume

THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

Mr. Chairman, I recommend

that legislation be enacted

WHICH WOULD PROVIDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, FOR THE FOLLOWING:

1.

A Federal Registry of Public Accountants authorized to

PRACTICE BEFORE THE SEC.

2.

All

public accountants who are licensed and in good

STANDING BEFORE A STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY AND THE SEC
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MAY REGISTER TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE SEC.

Firms

3.
a

of accountants who are licensed or registered by

State Board of Accountancy

and who are in good standing

BEFORE SAID STATE BOARD AND THE SEC MAY REGISTER TO PRAC
TICE BEFORE THE SEC.

A.

A Certificate of Registration shall be issued to each

ACCOUNTANT AND ACCOUNTING FIRM AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE BE

FORE THE SEC AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO RENEWAL EVERY THREE

YEARS.

5.The Certificate of Registration shall authorize the
REGISTERED ACCOUNTANT AND/OR ACCOUNTING FIRM TO PRACTICE

BEFORE THE SEC IN ANY STATE, TERRITORY OR SUBDIVISION OF
the

United States.

6.

No STATE OR AGENCY THEREOF MAY INTERFERE WITH A REGIS

TERED ACCOUNTANT OR ACCOUNTING FIRM WHO IS ENGAGED IN THE

CONDUCT OF AN AUDIT PURSUANT TO SECURITIES LAWS OF THE

United States,
7.

and rules and regulations thereunder.

Registered accountants

or accounting firms shall be sub

ject TO ALL STANDARDS, RULES AND CODES PROMULGATED BY THE

SEC.

8.

The SEC,

after application of due process procedures,

SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE THE REGISTRA-
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TION OF AN ACCOUNTANT OR ACCOUNTING FIRM.

9.

The SEC

shall enunciate standards for peer review which

SHALL BE FAIR, EQUITABLE AND MEANINGFUL.

Naturally,

the foregoing recommendations are subject

TO SPECIFICITY and amplification.

Mr. Chairman,

the time for action is now.

Please do

NOT BE MISLED BY THE APPEALS FOR TIME FOR SELF-REGULATION.

In 1975,

when we discussed restructure, there were those

WHO HOPED THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD DISAPPEAR.

LEM DID NOT DISAPPEAR.

BUT THE PROB

SENATOR METCALF AND REPRESENTATIVE MOSS

SAW TO THAT.

NOW, THEY ARE HOPING, ONCE AGAIN, THAT THE PROBLEM WILL
GO AWAY.

YOU MUST NOT PERMIT THE NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC AND

A VERY LARGE SEGMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRACTITIONERS TO BE

SHUNTED ASIDE.

Mr. Chairman,

forgive me for a personal reference.

Many

PRACTITIONERS ASK ME WHY AT THIS STAGE OF MY PROFESSIONAL
CAREER, I RUN THE RISK OF BEING CALLED A GADFLY OR DISSENTOR.
As A RATHER SUCCESSFUL PRACTITIONER, I HAVE ASKED MYSELF

THE SAME QUESTION AND THE ANSWER ALWAYS IS, "SOMEONE HAS TO
DO IT."

Thank

you.
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To the
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on oversight and investigations
of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce

Prepared by
Joseph P. Alam, CPA
Alam & Company
Certified Public Accountants
Detroit, Michigan

My name is Joseph P. Alam. I am a certified public accountant
practicing in Detroit, Michigan.
I attended the University of
Detroit and graduated in 1960 with a B.S. in accounting. Upon
completion of my full time military obligations I began employ
ment with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company.
In 1963 I received
my CPA certificate and in 1964 founded the firm which was the pred
ecessor of Alam & Company.
My first exposure to the bias in favor of the big eight accounting
firms occurred while still attending college.
I will never forget
our auditing instructor, a former partner in a national firm,
solemnly intoning to the assembled students that the signature of
a big eight accounting firm on a financial statement was like
the word sterling engraved on silver. Well, he and other
instructors did their job well. By graduation time we were
convinced that if we didn’t obtain employment with one of these
firms we had already failed.
Imagine that. Before our first
day on the job we would be considered failures in our own eyes and
in the eyes of our fellow graduates.
I was too unsophisticated
in those days to recognize the unhealthy relationship that fre
quently exists between these firms and the educational community.
What would a student know about fees paid for research projects,
part time and summer employment, fees paid to educators for
staff development courses and staff training assistance? What
did I know about the flood of accounting literature which covers
the desks and shelves of every accounting instructor’s desk all
provided by the big eight firms? Nothing back then, nothing at all.

While at Peat, Marwick I learned several lessons. First of all
I found out that what we learned at the firms very excellent
staff training schools had little applicability if it conflicted
with one of the firms two gods ’’The Time Budget”. Woe the poor
young man who exceeded his budget, on him the wrath of the firm
would fall. This led to the belief that this year’s audit should
just be a copy of the previous year’s. Why take a fresh look,
instead take the safe route.
But there was a way to make the partners happy. Pay allegiance
to the second of the firms two gods, "Practice Development".
Join the Jaycees, be active. Work hard at bringing in new clients.
Then all would be well.

Little did I realize in those days the implications for the
business community this emphasis on these two areas of practice.
FIRM PROFITABILITY
FIRM GROWTH

Let me detail specific problems encountered by small practitioners
as a result of the activities of the major accounting firms.

The large accounting firms have come to control our largest
professional organizations. Amongst practitioners, members of
the national accounting firms, members of local accounting firms
and members in industry or education very little disagreement
exists on this point.
The only debate focuses around the benefits, advantages, dis
advantages and inevitability of this control.
I refer you to
question six of the survey entitled What accountants think about
the Metcalf Report as published by the Practical Accountant, one
of the major publications serving our profession in its November,
December, 1977 issue, a copy of which is attached (EXHIBIT). What
are the practical affects of this control on the small firm?
They are many and far reaching.
It is extremely difficult for
local practitioners to obtain positions on important AICPA
committees. Each year the Institute mails our firm a listing
of its committees, the anticipated time requirement for its
activities and an idea of what travel is necessary.
Each year
my partners and I have carefully reviewed this listing, discussed
our obligations to other organizations and indicated our willing
ness and ability to perform.
Never have we received even the
courtesy of a reply.
I have talked to many other practitioners
who have had exactly the same experience. AICPA employees have
informed me that such appointments are made upon the recommendation
of the state societies.
I have been assured by the Executive
director of the Michigan Association of Certified Public
Accountants (MACPA) that at least in our state such is not the
case. After directing the question to two full time staff
members of the Institute, the executive director of MACPA and
numerous local practitioners I still have only a vague idea how
some committee members are selected. What are the reasons given
by the Institute for limiting involvement of local firm members?
First of all there are just too many members and too few
committee appointments. My answer to that is simple.
The large
firms seem to have no difficulty in obtaining the appointments
they want.
Secondly, and this is the answer offered most
frequently, small firms cannot afford the time and cost required
to serve effectively. We receive time and travel estimates from
the AICPA, make our committments and someone somewhere decides
we cannot afford to participate! Well I guess they know more
about our financial position than we do.
Isn't that really the
only possible logical explanation. Lastly, we hear about the
problems of geography. How can a firm in California serve when
the Institute is located in New York. Another bogey man. Why
must or should committee meetings be held in New York.
I suspect
that a good number of them are not.
If geography is really a
problem the Institute should decentralize. After all we are not
here to serve the AICPA, it exists to serve the membership.
The large firms have effectively used the AICPAs rules on adver
tising to pirate away the clients of local practitioners. Perhaps
the most damaging technique used in our area has been the centrally
prepared educational seminar. Our clients are freely solicited
to attend canned programs put out by national firms to see how
the industry "experts" do it. Many small firms are just as
knowledgeable, just as expert, but the cost of assembling these
programs for a once or twice presentation is prohibitive.
Only
the big firms with their ability to use these programs over
and over again in city after city can afford their cost.

At one such seminar which we attended under client auspices the
presentor was freely distributing literature bearing its name and
describing the many benefits to be derived from the use of its
computor programs.
Our letter of complaint directed to the
Institute went unanswered. The practical effect of these seminars
has been to circumvent the Institutes rules on advertising, rules
which prevent the local practitioner from holding himself out
as a specialist, even if he is one.
The damage done to local
firms has been incalculable.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of domination has occurred
as a result of the hearings conducted by this subcommittee and
that chaired by the late Senator Metcalf. The Institute response
has been a careful, well orchestrated, one-sided defense of the
position of the national accounting firms.
No where in our
professional publications or in the national press can you find
the Institute dealing with the kinds of serious problems smaller
firms agree exist within the accounting profession.
Rather staff
members deny or attempt to explain away the problems of
domination or undue concentration of services. Local prac
titioners did not have any meaningful role in formulating a
response to the complaints lodged against our profession.
I
believe the AICPA has forfeited any claim to represent local
practitioners.
Attached as exhibit B is a copy of the AICPA brochure entitled Voluntary
Quality Control Review Program for CPA Firms.
It deals in a
meaningful way with many of the problems of smaller CPA firms.
It ignores entirely the management problems of the large firms.
UNREALISTIC GROWTH OBJECTIVES, AND UNREALISTIC PROFIT OBJECTIVES

The real abuses that have plagued our profession did not result
from incompetency, lack of proper training programs, etc.
Rather they have resulted from the pressure cooker atmosphere
that big firm partners work in. These people risk their entire
career if they lose a major client.
If the managing partner
of a local office cannot expand his office in accordance with
policy dictated by the home office, he is replaced.
The pressure
on these individuals is obvious.
In Detroit we see a constant
parade of partners being brought in from other parts of the
country to run the local offices. Why? Can’t we develop
indigenous partners. The answer is simple. New York partners
do not understand the very cylinical nature of our essentially
static market area.
Consequently they are unwilling to accept
the nature of growth in the Metropolitan area.
If the national
firms set growth objectives of between 10%-20% per year and are
willing to commit the time and money to accomplish these
objectives - just whose clients are they going to take? And
just what chance is there of achieving these goals if a good
client is lost? The large firms make the argument that small
firms can easily lose their independence as a result of a loss
of a major client.
In fact the truth is just the opposite.
Once you accept the fact that firms are made up of people not

partners you can understand how the large firms get into the
type of messes which have been so frequently highlighted in
the financial press, and which have necessitated the hearings
of this subcommittee and that of the late Senator Metcalf.
Fee pressures are a constant problem in public accounting.
Client management is understandably reluctant to give outside
auditors, or anyone for that matter, a blank check on their
account.
This is particularly true in periods when earnings
are depressed or even non-existant. Yet these are the very
times when management is most likely to attempt to manipulate
earnings.
This conflict is obvious-an attempt by management
to reduce its cost and a possible need to expand auditing
procedures. Quality vs Profit. Where does the large firm put
its emphasis. Theoretically on the side of quality, but every
audit partner, every managing partner knows that the reality
is that his future rests not on the very difficult to ascertain
subjective standard of quality, but rather on the easily quantifyable,
objectively determinable standard of profitability.
I do not
suggest this conflict can be easily resolved.
I do suggest that
the emphasis on time budgets is badly overdone.
As a result of the well financed practice expansion programs
of the national accounting firms an unhealthy degree of
concentration has come to exist within our profession.
Once
again I wish to point out the disservice the AICPA has done
the majority of its members by attempting to explain away in
an oversimplistic manner the problem of concentration.
CPA firms are unique for just one reason, only
they can issue an opinion on financial statements. All other
services offered by our profession are offered by others, ie
tax return preparers, law firms, management consultants, book
keeping services, etc.
So there is really only one reason for
CPA firms to exist, to issue an opinion on financial statements.
But are we all, in fact, really able to do so? Theoretically yes.
If you have your license from the state board and have main
tained your good standing.
But look at why auditors are
engaged? In most cases some outside party requires that
statements be certified. Who? In most cases the government,
a lending institution or an underwriter. What has actually
happened is that outside third parties have usurped the
authority of the state to determine who can or cannot issue
an opinion on financial statements. They have a kind of
veto power over whose signature is acceptable and whose is not.
The large accounting firms recognized this early in the game
and carefully orchestrated their capability as specialists
to all who would listen. The results have been disastrous
to small firms. Underwriters began to insist that big eight firms
be employed before they would agree to handle offerings of
securities to the public. The results are well known.

Almost all publicly held companies are audited by large
accounting firms.
I predict that unless this subcommittee or
some government agency intercedes on the behalf of the smaller

firms it is only a matter of time before all this work is
performed by the large firms.
It strikes me as wrong that our
government’s efforts to protect the investing public has been
used as an excuse to expand the practice of a few large firms,
to create an oligopolistic structure within our profession.
Mind you this trend is not over. Almost every company which
experiences a degree of success must have access to the public
money markets. Must they inevitably employ large firm auditors?
Why? For marketing purposes' One of the few areas of audit
practice in which smaller firms have been able to maintain a
presence is in the audit of municipalities. We have been able
to do so because many local ordinances require that multiple
bids be solicited and that the low bid be accepted.
The
widely publicized financial plight of many cities has created a
demand by the underwriters of municipal bonds that future
prospectises contain audited financial statements. This is as
it should be.
Investors have a right to be informed. Does this
mean the role of the small firm as municipal auditor is coming
to an end.
Only time will tell, but I suspect so. Think about
the structure of the securities industry, the disappearance
from the scene of the many small local underwriting firms and
the increasingly important role of a few giant New York based
underwriters.
I’m afraid that under todays systems, the system
fostered by and defended by the AICPA, its rules, regulations,
and structure, the future for many small, fine CPA firms is
predictable. They will not survive in their present form.
Let’s
look at the recent division of firms. What does it actually
accomplish except to institutionalize and protect the position
of a few large firms. Alam & Company has three clients which are
subject to the reporting requirement of the SEC. We have a
staff of 17 professionals 8 of whom are Certified Public
Accountants. We have two technical partners, an audit partner,
and a tax partner. One of the requirements for membership in
the SEC Section is for the rotation of audit partners.
How
does a small firm rotate audit partners when you have but one.
Further, this requirement has little affect on the large firms
because the key man on the engagement is frequently not the
partner.
In all but the largest clients it is probably the audit mana,
On some of the smaller clients it is probably an audit supervisor.
So as a practical matter it is likely that this requirement
will have little effect on large firms. Their structure protects
them. Often they have been retained in the first place at the
insistence of third parties. They are not as dependent on
personal relationships.
In a small firm partners tend to be
more involved in the actual audit work and to retain their
clients because of personal contacts. It is obvious who will
benefit from this rule. We have been told that relief will be
offered for ’’hardship cases" on a one-by-one basis. Well, who
wants to be a hardship case? Why not instead build in the
protection small firms need. Once one understands the predatory
nature of the large accounting firms the use of the
client information the SEC Practice Section requires under
section 3(g)(8) of the membership requirements becomes

suspect.
Of what practical value is this information? It is
not improbable that it will be summarized and distributed to
the local offices as likely client acquisition prospects. When
compared to other client acquisition techniques employed by
the large firms this would be a rather innocuous procedure.
The large firms defend the concentration of services within
the SEC practice area with a couple of very transparent
arguments.
First of all they say that large companies require
large audit firms.
With the very largest companies that is
probably true.
But many companies perhaps most companies who
have sold securities to the public are not giant international
corporations.
In the mid to late sixties and the early
seventies large numbers of smaller companies ’’went public”.
These companies are the logical market for the services of small
accounting firms. They do not require nor can they afford to
employ the more sophisticated talents of the big firms.
But
they do employ these firms - they must if they wish continued
access to the public markets.
In the last few years some
recognizing that the advantages of employing a
smaller firm outweighs the supposed value of access to an
illusionary money market have started to drift back to the smaller
firms. They should.
They can get better service at a lower cost
The division of firms as presently structured should effectively
stop this outflow.

A second argument frequently employed is that only bigness
can provide the level of expertise required to service clients
subject to the reporting requirements of the SEC.
They point
to the level of spending required to prepare and disseminate
information to keep their partners and staff aware of current
developments. They ignore the availability of commercial
reporting services such as Commerce Clearing House.
They
ignore the really excellent assistance available from SEC
personnel. Do they contend that only they are qualified to
represent clients in front of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Surely nothing can be more complex than the tax laws. Much of
this money is spent in an attempt to overcome the communication
problems created in a large centrally controlled multi-office firms.
No, all it takes to develop the special knowledge required
is the opportunity to work on a number of SEC clients. You
must remember that there are few real differences in the audit
of a publicly held or a privately owned company. Most of the
differences are in the reporting area. A third argument advanced
by the big firms is that of geography. They contend that
clients with multi plant or office locations requires accounting
firms with offices in many cities. Another bogy-man. Why?
Most of these medium sized companies have centralized accounting
departments. Their accounting is all done in one city. While there
may be auditing steps which must be performed at each location
they are relatively minor tasks (but none the less important)
which can be performed by transferring staff on temporary
assignment, by the use of correspondent firms or by some combin
ation of these techniques, i.e. transfer of supervisory personnel
and the use of correspondent firm lower level employees.

In my opinion none of these arguments can stand up under close
examination.

While most of the discussion to date has focused around
concentration within the SEC practice area, the problem is much
more widespread.
In most large American cities it is very
difficult for a local CPA firm to obtain any referrals to clients
who require an audit of their financial statements. Frankly,
we must fight to keep what we have.
In just the last year on
two separate occasions we have been confronted with bank requests.
for a big eight accounting firms.
In one instance this requirement
was written right into the loan agreement. This loan by the way
was supported by a 90% guarantee of an agency of the U.S. Government.
We did not get that client and the reason cited was the bank
loan agreement. On another occasion a large client was
attempting to increase his bank line. The institution he was
working with was informed by the New York based bank that was
considering the over line that a requirement of their partic
ipation would be the retention of a big eight accounting firm.
Fortunately some of my friends in New York were able to inter
cede in our behalf and we retained the client.
So you can see
that concentration leads to further concentration.
Let me list
for you other industries completely dominated by the large firms.
Banks
Savings and loan associations
Broker-dealers
Hospitals and other health care institutions
Retailers (other than mama-papa type stores)

These are all local markets which small firms are competent to
serve. At the current time we are not able to do so.
The reasons
have to do with marketing, not capability.
In reviewing the similarities and differences between the SEC
PRACTICE SECTION and the PRIVATE COMPANIES PRACTICE SECTION one
is struck more by the similarities than the differences.

Eligibility for membership
Adherence to AICPA quality
control standards
Peer review
Continuing Professional Education
requirement
Partner rotation
Submit detailed information
for public inspection
Maintain minimum amounts of
professional liability insurance
Offer management advisory
services (MAS)
Report MAS by client for SEC
clients
Pay dues

SEC
Section

Private
Companies
Section

ALL FIRMS

ALL FIRMS

YES
YES

YES
YES

40 Hours
YES

40 Hours
NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES
YES

NO
YES

Public Oversight Board
Sanctions against firms
Financing and staffing

MUST
YES
AICPA

CAN
YES
AICPA

There are some limitations on the type of, services that can be
offered to SEC SECTION clients. After reviewing this list you
might ask yourself why we are restructuring the entire profession
,to accomplish such narrow ends.
I cannot answer that question.
There is some talk that the kind of reporting required by small
clients differs from that required by large clients. That may or
may not be the case.
I submit Exhibit C, an article entitled
The impact of FASB statements on small business by Marshall S.
Armstrong, chairman of the FASB as published in the August, 1977
issue of the Journal of Accountancy.
It details some of the problems
with that approach.
Even if the position that two sets of report
ing standards are required is accepted, most will apply to both
kinds of companies.
To date there are only a couple of areas
that are being talked about namely earnings per share and seg
ment reporting.
This seems hardly enough reason to restructure
a whole profession.
Another problem facing local firms is the practice known as
’’buying in” on engagements. As described by a big eight partner
at an MACPA seminar which I attended this practice involves
bidding jobs in order to achieve market penetration rather than
with the objective of making a profit.
In a commercial enterprise
other than a profession this would be forbidden as a predatory
pricing practice.
It is quite widespread and the reason for its
use varies. Perhaps the CPA firm thinks the client has sig
nificant use for services other than those being quoted. Maybe
they want to sell additional tax and management advisory services
but require a larger audit base in order to justify in house
specialists. They "buy” the audit. Local firms cannot do business
on that basis. We have no giant utilities or large multi national
clients to subsidize the growth of specific segments of our
practice. We must have the opportunity to make a profit on each
piece of work we do. We cannot afford "loss leaders”. Attached
as Exhibit D is a reprint of an article from The New York Times
entitled How far should practice development go? I would like
you to know that in our market area the price cutting goes much,
much deeper than is alluded to in this article.

The audit committee presents a problem for small firms. All
of us recognize the potential benefits to be derived by having
non-management directors involved in the selection process.
There are some doubts in my mind as to just how these directors
can evaluate auditor performance without resorting to information
provided by management.
I suspect they cannot.

The danger to small firms is that audit committee members, in
an attempt to put as much equity between themselves and possible
litigation, will increasingly call for the appointment of big firm
auditors. At least one big eight firm in our area is already
capitalizing on this possibility. A seminar was offered to bank
directors on the subject of directors' liability.
It turned out
to be primarily a pitch in favor of audit committees.

So they are a mixed blessing, undoubtedly good for the profession,
but sure to be abused to the detriment of the smaller firms.

Well, where does all this lead. Frankly it is very unlikely that
the AICPA or the large accounting firms are going to reform themselves.
It is doubtful that they even see the need for reform.
I am sure
they would quarrel with much if not all we have presented here
today. Unless the government is willing to take an activist
role nothing will change. Let me offer some suggestions.
The Securities and Exchange Commission should issue guidelines
to the broker-dealer community which it regulates either directly
or through the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD)
detailing those circumstances under which a change of auditors
can be requested, and providing damages to CPA firms for loss
of clients due to inappropriate underwriter actions.
Audit committees should be provided with a listing of claims and
lawsuits outstanding at the date of retention.
Only with this
information can they truly understand the financial position of
the firm they are engaging. This listing should be comprehensive
and not limited as currently anticipated by the SEC Practice Section.

The profession should lose whatever exemption it enjoys from the
provisions of the anti-trust laws. Predatory pricing should be
specifically prohibited.
Other regulated industries, i.e. banks should be issued guidelines
for requesting changes in customers' auditors. Provision should
be made for damages to firms for changes requested for unauthor
ized reasons.
Lastly and most importantly the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, it's committees, councils and boards and divisions
should be opened up to all members.
If this requires decentralization
it should be decentralized. Only in this way can past abuses be
corrected.

Thank you for this opportunity to present my views.

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF ALAN BROUT, CPA
TO BE PRESENTED JANUARY 31, 1978 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 95th CONGRESS,
SECOND SESSION
I am Alan Brout, the managing partner of Brout & Company.
Brout & Company is the successor to a firm of certified public
accountants established by my father in 1921. We have since that
time earned a reputation, of which we are proud, for competence
and integrity in the practice of our profession in the New York
metropolitan area. In 1968 we opened an office in Los Angeles
and this year an office in Morristown, New Jersey. The firm
consists of 16 partners and a professional staff of about 100.
We have approximately 15 clients who are subject to the reporting
requirements of the SEC.

I, on behalf of my firm, am one of 18 members of the AICPA
who brought an action early this month under Article 78 of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York. The petition challenges the establishment by
AICPA Council of a division of firms consisting of two sections,
principally on the grounds that the act violates the AICPA bylaws.
We contend that sectionalization, as promulgated, will severely
restrict the abilities of smaller local and regional CPA firms to
secure and retain audits of publicly held companies.
While it would be repetitious in view of the other statements
presented to go into the background and reasoning which led us to
take this route, I would like to emphasize several points. First,
it seems ironic that the very attacks on the dominant power of the
Big Eight in the AICPA have triggered a response by that organiza
tion which can only make them more dominant in this crucial area
of audit practice. We have only to look at the composition of the
Executive Committee of the SEC practice section to see that large
firm domination is assured in perpetuity. The Committee consists
of 21 members. Any firm, regardless of competence or reputation
is assured a seat if it audits 30 or more publicly held companies.
Five seats are reserved for those auditing fewer than 30 such
registrants. I believe that 16 firms were entitled to seats on
the initial committee under the "30 or more" rule. The composition
of the Committee is therefore fixed to the extent of 76% of its
members. Presumably, there could be rotation in the other five
places but appointments after the initial Executive Committee is
established require approval of the then existing Executive
Committee.
It is hard to believe that dissenting views would
obtain any representation under this stacked-deck situation.
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It is worth noting that the AICPA is soon to distribute a mail
ballot to the AICPA membership. The members will be asked to amend
the bylaws to permit 1) expanding the board of directors of the
AICPA by adding three public members and 2) allowing non-practicing
members to serve as officers of the Institute and members of the
trial board. It was regarded as unnecessary to submit the major
restructuring creating the division of firms to the membership at
large. One cannot believe that this was engendered by any motiva
tion other than a fear that such a vote on the two-section proposal
would have been overwhelmingly negative. A second point with
regard to our action is the feeling that whatever standards are
ultimately adopted by the SEC practice section peer review committee
will inevitably emphasize those standards applicable to the largest
national and international firms which will necessitate detailed
formal procedures required in a multi-office, multi-national
operation. Smaller firms adopting such formalized standards will
probably find themselves economically penalized and more reluctant
to compete in this important area.

As late as January 4, I was told that approximately 1,050 firms
had applied for the private firms section and 350 for the SEC
practice section. Of those 350, 250 were currently serving no
publicly held clients. They may have agreed to join the Section in
the hope that they may be able to do some SEC work in the future.
It is entirely possible that within our lifetime we might conceivably
see a revival of the market for equities. Most CPA firms would not
like to be foreclosed from serving their existing clientele if they
ever reach the state of eligibility to raise equity capital through
a public offering. Another reason for applying may be the gnawing
fear that failure to belong to the SEC practice section would
indicate to bankers, attorneys and potential clients that a firm
failing to join was a little less qualified to render all the
services that CPA firms generally offer.
In a letter to its members of August 23 the AICPA leadership
answered a question on first-class and second-class distinctions
with the phrase that "...the public is not likely to conclude that
there are first- and second-class CPA’s unless we keep repeating
that this is so." Nevertheless, I believe that, as a practical
matter, any firm harboring the slightest hope of ever doing SEC work
will join the SEC practice section which, as I previously indicated,
is structurally designed to be perpetually dominated by the giants.
While the communications concerning sectionalization have emphasized
that membership is purely voluntary, I think everyone recognizes
that for economic and competitive purposes it would be foolish for
any firm seriously engaged in, or wanting to qualify for SEC work,
to remain on the outside looking in. The sole reason for the
"voluntary" label was to allow the AICPA to maintain the fiction
that no bylaw amendment was required.
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In the event we prevail in our action, I believe it unlikely
that the plan of the AICPA could be amended and submitted to its
membership in a form which would be accepted by a majority of
members. I myself could support a division of firms (without two
sections) as long as that division reflected a more representative
cross-section of the profession. It has been stated that the Big
Eight might then decide to pull out of the AICPA and establish
their own grouping. While I do not feel that such fragmentation
would be in the public interest, I believe that the fragmentation
resulting from the September 17 AICPA Council vote is even less so.
The petitioners who brought the action undoubtedly have varying
views. A number of us believe that the AICPA may never be wholly
effective in professional self-regulation. I personally feel that
the SEC should have a more active role in determining the standards
of those privileged to practice before it. My own experience with
the SEC staff dates back over 20 years. There is no government
agency with which I have come in contact that has exhibited a higher
level of professionalism, competence and helpfulness than the SEC
as represented by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office
of Chief Accountant. They have been helpful to the less experienced
practitioner and scrupulously fair in listening to opposing view
points. I feel that small and medium-sized practitioners are
welcomed by the SEC and that the Commission’s involvement in
professional regulation would take such firms’ interests into
account.

The subcommittee has asked me to comment on the advantages and
disadvantages of audit committees for large and small firms. In
view of Chairman Williams’ recent statements as well as the position
of the New York Stock Exchange, the AICPA and both the Metcalf and
Moss subcommittees, to say anything in opposition to audit committees
could be construed as high treason. Certainly, in the case of larger
publicly held companies, such as the Fortune 1,000, audit committees
can prove to be a vital cog in the independence machinery. Neverthe
less, I feel that in the smaller company, which typically went public
in the '60’s and would probably prefer to be privately held today,
the inability to obtain competent outside directors, the first step
to an independent audit committee, will render them ineffective. Of
our 15 publicly held clients, to date only five have established audit
committees consisting of outside directors. My concern is that, as
audit committees proliferate in smaller and medium-sized publicly
held companies, there will be a gradual shift from smaller to larger
firm auditors. Certainly, a member of an audit committee of a
potential client, conscious of possible liabilities, might tend to
choose affluence over competence. His decision in a marginal
situation may be based on which firm has the deepest pocket to pay
off potential claims in this litigious world. He might feel that
it would be easier, two years down the road if placed on a witness
stand, to defend a choice of Arthur Andersen rather than John Jones
& Company whom no-one ever heard of.
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I have also some concern as to whether a less sophisticated
audit committee, conscious of spending shareholders’ funds, might
reflect the view that all audit reports read the same, include the
identical two-paragraph opinion and that one might as well obtain
the cheapest. Any firm has two hurdles to overcome — management
which will probably make the initial selection and the audit
committee which may or may not ratify that selection. To the extent
audit committees are given an unrestricted right to select auditors
without sufficient management influence, the task of the smaller
firms will be that much harder.
I have discussed the matter with other practitioners from
similar-sized local and regional firms. The consensus is that we
will be doing well to retain our existing publicly held clientele —
that the chances of obtaining new clients who are or wish to become
public will be slim indeed.
One of the less appealing features of the two-section plan is
the method of financing the structure. Paragraph X of the Plan,
dealing with financing and staffing, states that the costs of staff
and meetings are paid out of the general budget of the AICPA. The
cost of the Public Oversight Board and Special Projects, whatever
those are, are paid out of the dues of the section. Presumably,
the costs of publication, dissemination and other charges will also
be borne by the general membership. It is certain that such costs
will be material and in view of the fact that only 15% of the AICPA
membership represent Big Eight accounting firms, the majority of
the smaller and medium-sized firm members are required to subsidize
the sectionalization program to an unknown but significant extent.
It seems that we are being asked to pay in advance for our own
funeral.

I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to express
my views. I am certain these hearings will result in action which
will further the public interest in this important area.

Testimony of

Charles Kaiser, Jr., C.P.A.
Managing Partner

Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company
on Self Regulatory Organization Measures
of the AICPA
Before the House Subcommittee

on Oversight and Investigations
January 31, 1978

The need for reform in the accounting profession has long
been recognized.

In October, 1974, the Commission on Auditors

Responsibilities, the Cohen Commission, was established by

the accounting profession to study the role and responsibility

of independent auditors and in the spring of 1977 issued its

report of tentative conclusions.

At. the same time, Congress

was also investigating the profession.

One such investigation

was responsible for a highly critical staff study, the Metcalf

Staff Study, released December, 1976.

The Metcalf Staff Study apparently developed a crisis atmos
phere in the profession.

Instead of looking to the Cohen

Commission and the recommendations suggested by that blue
ribbon panel to meet the challenges facing the profession,

the AICPA, in a crisis mode, developed a proposal to division
alize the profession, campaigning for its adoption as "the
only game in town."

This proposal was adopted by the Council

of the AICPA in September, 1977 and is now being implemented.

The concept of divisionalization - semantically but not
substantively modified to "sectionalization" - emanated from
Advisory Group C, one of the three advisory groups appointed

a number of years ago to assist the management and adminis
tration of the AICPA.

In addition to Advisory Group C,
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which is composed of representatives of the 15 largest
CPA firms, there are also Advisory Groups A and B composed

of representatives from the small and medium sized firms.

At the May, 1977 meeting of the Council when the Cohen
Commission report was discussed, alternative reforms were
not introduced.

Neither was the concept of divisionalization

presented to the Council.

In fact, my first exposure to the

divisionalization proposal came in late June at a meeting of

Advisory Group B when the program was explained to us by
Wallace E. Olson, President of the AICPA.

Mr. Olson indi

cated at that time that regional meetings of Council would
be convened throughout the summer to expose the proposal and
that it would be submitted to the September meeting of the
AICPA Council for adoption.

Since the divisionalization proposal contained changes
fundamental to the structure of public accounting, I imme

diately exposed it to Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, the

firm for which I serve as Managing Partner.

As a national

CPA firm founded in 1911 with 27 offices and 90 partners in

the United States and an international affiliation with more
than 160 offices, we were vitally concerned with this hastily

conceived proposal which we believed to be inimical to the
total reform needed.

In September, 1977, therefore, Harris,
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Kerr, Forster issued a statement opposing the proposal to
divisionalize the AICPA.

That statement now can be seen to

be prophetic.

The full text of the statement is appended to the written

copy of my testimony before you today.

In summary, it

argues that the divisionalization proposal is undesirable

for the following reasons:

1.

It intensifies the current excessive concentration

of major corporation audits in the "Big Eight" - a
condition deplored in the Metcalf report.

2.

It ignores one of the profession's most serious

problems, i.e., the fragmented manner in which we
develop and attempt to enforce professional
standards.

3.

It encourages Congressional supervision of the

profession.

4.

It increases the exposure of CPA firms to anti
trust litigation.

5.

It will cause an erosion in the practices of all

small firms and force unwanted mergers with larger
organizations.
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Since the text is attached, I shall not read it into the
record.

I note, however, that we expressed the view that

the AICPA Council should not impose such a drastic change
upon the full membership without evidence of an overwhelming

favorable concensus.

To obtain a valid concensus, we argued

that a vote of the entire membership was needed.

Again, the

prophecy of those words was borne out in a recent litigation
filed against the AICPA on the ground that reform of the

magnitude adopted by the Council was so fundamental to the
structure of the AICPA that it is, in effect, an amendment
of the by-laws and therefore requires full membership approval.

Harris, Kerr, Forster is neither a participant in the liti
gation nor a contributor to fund the cost of the suit.

In

fact, when the AICPA adopted the divisionalization concept,

I wrote to Mr. Olson, stating, "While we remain skeptical of
Council's decision, we do recognize our responsibility to
abide by the majority view and work toward its satisfactory

implementation."

Harris, Kerr, Forster does not oppose the basic proposals

suggested in the divisionalization program.

To the contrary,

we believe the program contains reforms fundamental to

responsible public reporting.

But we cannot condone the

structure developed to implement and enforce these reforms.
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To paraphrase from another profession, the appropriate
directive from you ought to be, "Accountant, heal thyself!"
I firmly believe the profession has the capability and

should be permitted to implement its own meaningful reform.
The profession should also be allowed a reasonable time

period, at least until the end of 1978, to place its own
house in order.

This could be accomplished by utilizing

fundamental strengths contained in the divisionalization
proposal, provided that proposal is modified to eliminate

the deficiencies we perceive.

To this end, the Subcommittee

certainly could provide positive impetus by promulgating a
conceptual framework which would be acceptable and which
would obviate the necessity for legislation.

As to the conceptual framework, the following deficiencies

in the adopted divisionalization program should be corrected:

1.

The two section concept should be eliminated.

It

is inappropriate to create first and second class

citizens under the AICPA banner.

The Firms

Membership Division which has been established
should continue, and membership criteria should be

the same whether or not firms engage in SEC
practice.

To distinguish between sizes or cate

gories of firms is unnecessary as, for example,
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the standards for peer review should be identical
for all firms.

All users of audit information

should be entitled to the same standards of

excellence; therefore, all member firms should

be measured against the same standard of perfor

mance.

2.

The Executive Committee of the Firms Membership

Division should neither be self perpetuating nor
assure automatic membership to the larger firms.

In effect, the requirements of membership on the
current SEC Practice Section Executive Committee
guarantees seats to the 15 largest firms, all of
which coincidentally belonged to Group C which

promulgated the divisionalization concept in the
first place.

This is tantamount to "placing the

fox in charge of the chicken coop."

As a matter

of fact, immediately upon formation of the Execu

tive Committee of the SEC Practice Section, it was

given senior committee status which allows it to
promulgate its own rules without approval of

either the Council or the Board of Directors of
the AICPA.

Coincidentally, also, the Managing

Partner of the country's largest accounting firm

was appointed Chairman of the Committee.
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What is needed, instead, is a truly representative
Executive Committee.

The number of representatives

of the largest firms who could serve at any one

time should be limited.

In other words, if a

twelve member Executive Committee were appointed
through the regular AICPA procedure for selection

of committee members, it should be composed of

representatives of four firms which would have
fallen into the Group A category, four firms which

would have fallen within the Group B category and
four firms which would have fallen into the Group
C category.

In addition, a full-time, independent,

paid Chairman and two other public oversight
Committee members should be appointed.

The Chairman, as well as other oversight members,
should be energetic, competent and prestigious

citizens who are screened by a subcommittee repre

senting the entire membership of the AICPA.

The

full-time Chairman should be adequately compen

sated to attract an appropriate individual.

One

of the two public oversight members should be an
SEC Commissioner, while the other could be drawn

from academia or the business community.
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In summary, we believe the AICPA is a viable professional
organization which can regulate itself.

To do so, however,

self-interest must be subordinated to public need.

Your

guidance could assist us in achieving this objective.

Given

the appropriate opportunity and framework, I am sure we will

be able to demonstrate our responsibility to the public and

our responsiveness to Congressional concerns.

On behalf of Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, I thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you.

I would be

pleased to answer any questions you might have.

A Statement
Opposing
the Proposal to
Divisionalize
the AICPA
Prepared by
Harris, Kerr,
Forster & Company

September 1977

BACKGROUND AND
PURPOSE

SUMMARY OF
OBJECTIONS

Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, a na
tional CPA firm founded in 1911, has 27 offices
and 90 partners in the United States. Outside
the United States, we are affiliated with various
national accounting firms through an interna
tional association with more than 160 offices
known as Pannell Kerr Forster & Company. We
provide the full spectrum of professional ser
vices to clients of all sizes, including auditing
approximately 40 publicly-held companies
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Although the willingness to enact reform is
laudable, the specific means recommended to
accomplish it are open to challenge from within
the profession and from the Congress itself.
After comprehensive review of the proposal, we
believe divisionalization is undesirable for the
following reasons:

We are submitting this position paper to all
members of the AICPA Council because we
believe that the AICPA Board of Directors’ pro
posal to divisionalize the Institute is unrespon
sive to the needs of our profession today. We
believe that the proposal would undermine the
unity of the profession. We urge, therefore, that
it be rejected in its entirety and that valid alter
native proposals be considered.

The AICPA proposes to establish two divisions,
one for SEC Practice Firms and another for
Private Companies Practice Firms. Each would
regulate its own sphere of practice. Regulation
within each division would include periodic peer
review requirements, sanctions based upon
review findings, minimum standards for contin
uing education programs, public reporting of
financial information by member firms, and
other requirements relating to the execution of
audit engagements.

The divisionalization concept is intended to
satisfy Congressional concerns about the inade
quacies in the profession brought to the public’s
attention in recently concluded Congressional
hearings. Divisionalization, therefore, is being
proposed to provide the larger accounting firms
the means to adopt improved quality-control
measures to satisfy the critics. At the same time,
the proposal purportedly affords the smaller
firms a greater degree of autonomy in the con
duct of their practices. Both these aims,
desirable in themselves, can well be accom
plished without the irreparable damage to the
profession which divisionalization would cause.

1. It intensifies the current excessive con
centration of major corporation audits in
the “Big Eight”—a condition deplored in
the Metcalf report.
2. It ignores one of the profession’s most
serious problems, i.e., the fragmented
manner in which we develop and attempt
to enforce professional standards.
3. It encourages Congressional supervision
of the profession.
4. It increases the exposure of CPA firms
to antitrust litigation.

5. It will cause an erosion in the practices
of all small firms and force unwanted
mergers with larger organizations.
Congressional hearings were recently held in
Washington, D.C., by the Senate’s Subcommit
tee on Reports, Accounting and Management
of the Committee on Government Operations.
The hearings were prompted by the Metcalf
report, formally entitled “The Accounting
Establishment: A Staff Study,” an extensive
review of the accounting profession. Among the
recommendations of the report was the
following:
The Federal Government should act to relieve ex
cessive concentration in the supply of auditing and
accounting services to major publicly-owned
corporations.

The Institute’s proposal to create two divisions
will only exacerbate the concentration problem.
If divisions are created, major publicly-held cor
porations would appear irresponsible if they ap
pointed auditors not already members of the
Division of SEC Practice Firms.

Divisionalization is tantamount to the formation
of a private club for firms with SEC clients.
This club could stifle competition by setting
requirements that could make it difficult, if not
impossible, for small firms to become members.
By controlling membership this way, the Execu
tive Committee of the SEC Practice Firms Divi
sion could effectively deny publicly-held
companies the right to select firms which,
though not members of the club, still provide
high-quality service.
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission have targeted the professions for
possible antitrust violations for limiting competi
tion. In fact, the Metcalf report recommends
that these agencies
. . investigate and deter
mine whether violations of the Federal antitrust
laws have resulted from excessive concentration
in the supply of such services [auditing and ac
counting] among all industries or within specific
industries.” The AICPA proposal intensifies the
present concentration and, therefore, exposes
the profession to the very antitrust litigation it
should be seeking to minimize.

CONGRESSIONAL
CONCERN
The Metcalf Staff Study concerns itself with
public reporting by major corporations. This is
evidenced in the December 7, 1976, letter from
the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Lee Met
calf, which accompanied the staff report to the
Senate Committee on Government Operations:
... I am disturbed by . . . the alarming lack of in
dependence and lack of dedication to public pro
tection shown by the large accounting firms which
perform the key function of independently certify
ing the financial information reported by major
corporations to the public. [Emphasis added]

The divisionalization proposal does not address
the question of uniform quality necessary
throughout the profession. Why should the
CPA’s professional organization undertake
reform to improve public reporting for only ma
jor corporations? If reform is necessary, it
should be applied universally. Are not all users
of audited information entitled to the same stan
dards of excellence? Thousands of small com
panies, private and public, supply financial

information to banks, other credit grantors, and
government regulatory agencies that have the
right to expect the same high-quality informa
tion as that provided by major companies.
Those firms that follow the standards of the
SEC Practice Firms Division will erroneously ap
pear to be better than those that do not. Firms
in the SEC Practice Division will effectively en
joy the exclusive right to audit publicly-held
companies. They will also become the preferred
firms among other users of accounting services,
including lending institutions that influence
privately-held companies in their choice of
auditors. A credit grantor might well be re
garded as irresponsible if it recommends that a
company engage a firm which has not volun
tarily elected to meet the presumed higher pro
fessional standards of the SEC Practice Firms
Division. As a result, divisionalization will be
detrimental to the practice of all small firms.

The AICPA proposal purports to provide small
firms greater autonomy, since they will be
relieved of the burden of having to adopt the
same standards as larger firms. In the long run,
however, they will experience an inexorable
erosion of their practice as they lose clients to
the larger firms which, because of divisionaliza
tion, appear to be more qualified.

FRAGMENTATION OF
THE PROFESSION
In a statement before the Metcalf Subcommittee
on May 24, Eli Mason, the managing partner of
Mason & Company, a New York City-based
CPA firm, identified what has plagued the pro
fession for years and what constitutes a major
impediment in the effort to upgrade standards—
the fragmentation of the profession’s structure.
Only state boards license CPAs, but various
groups regulate them. The AICPA sets audit
standards. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board sets accounting standards. The Securities
and Exchange Commission sets disclosure stan
dards for public companies. The Cost Account
ing Standards Board sets cost accounting stan
dards. For reform to be meaningful, it must

bring all these standard-setting activities together
through a single organization with recognized,
unquestioned authority. The Institute’s proposal
not only fails to address the fragmentation prob
lem, but compounds it.

If the Institute’s Council approves divisionaliza
tion at its September 17 meeting (which it may
not even have the authority to do), CPAs will
only find the Congress urging more reform in
the near future. It is ironic and unfortunate that
a proposal designed to forestall Congressional
intervention may eventually encourage it
because of the proposal’s inherent defects.

DECISION REQUIRES
CONSENSUS
The Council should not impose such a drastic
change upon the membership without evidence
of an overwhelming consensus favoring the
change. To obtain a valid consensus, a vote of
the entire membership must be taken. The
Council’s regional meetings, which were con
ducted in a crisis atmosphere in August, provid
ed individual members neither the opportunity
to consider carefully the implications of the pro
posed divisionalization nor the forum to express
their views.

THERE ARE VALID
ALTERNATIVES
We believe there are valid, responsive alter
natives to the present proposal. Meaningful
reform must embody the concept of a single
organization, perhaps federally chartered or
created by statute, to promulgate all auditing
standards and procedures, accounting prin
ciples, rules of professional conduct, and
prerequisites pertaining to the practice of public
accounting. These uniformly determined rules
should be enforced without discrimination.

The AICPA-appointed Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Cohen Commis
sion) issued its “Report of Tentative Conclu
sions” last March with 40 recommendations
which “are designed to speed the pace of
change in the profession and to make it more
receptive to the forces of change in the future.”
One would think, therefore, that after the
Board of Directors of the Institute had the
foresight to appoint this special commission that
the profession might first attempt to implement
its final recommendations before resorting to the
crisis management proposal of divisionalization.
After all the time and effort expended by this
distinguished group, we cannot support a pro
posal which now splinters our profession rather
than addresses its basic problems. Instead of
plunging pell-mell into further confusion, we
urge that the Council of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants recognize its
responsibility to the membership and appoint its
own commission to implement the valid reforms
already suggested, which are both constructive
to the profession and responsive to its critics.
Only action of this magnitude will achieve the
long-range objectives of restoring public
confidence in the integrity and usefulness of
financial reports.
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This morning the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

continues its hearings into the self-regulatory efforts of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

Yesterday, we heard from several representatives of the

smaller accounting firms, who described the reasons why they have
We inquired in depth

difficulty in competing with the large firms.

as to whether the self-regulatory program of the AICPA is likely
to ameliorate or worsen that situation.

Today we will hear first from the Chairman of one of the
Big Eight accounting firms who will describe a proposal for
shared responsibility between the profession and the SEC.

We will

then hear from a former Chief Accountant of the SEC, and finally

from the Chairman of the SEC.
/

The SEC has clear authority to prescribe the form and
content of financial reports filed under the securities laws and

the methods to be followed in their preparation.

It has had such

authority since the inception of the federal securities laws,
and yet has been extremely reluctant to use it.

We hope to

explore how the SEC is now fulfilling the responsibilities for

which it was given authority.

We will also ask whether it is

prudent to rely on a self-regulatory program which has no formal

and direct connection to the SEC.
The SEC is uniquely suited to advise us on the merits of
the AICPA program.

In addition to its outstanding reputation as

a regulatory commission, the SEC has had much experience with the

strengths and weaknesses of self-regulation among securities
brokers.

Under the securities laws, a number of self-regulatory

organizations of securities brokers and dealers are registered

with the SEC and subject to its supervision.

That framework

has generally worked well, enabling the SEC to protect the

public interest while drawing on the expertise and resources

of the private sector to develop rules of professional conduct.
We look forward to hearing the SEC's views on the adequacy of

the AICPA program.

Our first witness this morning is Mr. Norman Auerbach,
Chairman of the

firm of Coopers&

Lybrand.
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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee and staff, my name is

Norman Auerbach.

I am the chairman and chief executive officer of

Coopers & Lybrand.

I welcome this opportunity to present my views

on the important issues that now face the profession.
I have followed closely the recent congressional interest in public
accounting and conclude that this attention has brought about some

needed focus on self-regulation in our profession. You, Mr. Chairman,
and

the

late

Senator

process of reform.

remains to be done.

Metcalf are

responsible for expediting this

I will review what has been accomplished and what
Also I hope to put into perspective the concerns

that remain and how those concerns are to be addressed.

RECENT KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Let me recount briefly the profession’s key accomplishments.

When

this congressional interest began about a year ago, I agreed that the

profession’s
auditing

procedures

standards

for establishing accounting principles

needed

change.

We

have

since made

and

substantial

progress toward self-reform.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board,

the apparatus for estab

lishing accounting principles, has revised its operating procedures

to meet

two

setting

by

essential needs - greater participation in standardsthe

public

and

the Board’s deliberations.

greater visibility,

’’sunshine,"

for

It has continued to move toward the

1

elimination of many alternatives in accounting principles - for
example,

accounting in the oil and gas industry - certainly,

desired objective.

a

The FASB is moving toward resolving some of the

highly complex accounting issues,

such as accounting for inflation,

business combinations, and pensions.

The FASB’s parent body - the

Financial Accounting Foundation - has also provided for greater

public participation.
A highly significant step was the establishment by the American

Institute of Certified Public Accountants of a Division of CPA firms
with two sections: the Private Companies Practice Section and the SEC
Practice Section. This latter organization of public company auditors

was formed within a few months of the Metcalf Subcommittee hearings -

and already over four hundred and twenty-five accounting firms have
signed up to participate in the Section’s activities.

Section,

subject to public oversight,

This new

has been given the responsi

bility for establishing the structure for maintaining audit quality.

Some of the requirements of membership include peer review, adherence

to the independence standards, continuing education of auditors, and
maintenance of operating standards for firms,
partners on engagements.

do,

however,

Finally,

All of these are in the public interest. I

have some concern about

smaller accounting firms.

the SEC is

including rotation of

the way they will affect

I’ll talk more about this matter later.

in the process of gathering

information that

relates to the independence of auditors and the impact on independ
ence of the broad scope of public accountants’ services.

The Commis

sion is currently studying the public response to its proposal for
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disclosure by registrants of the services provided by their auditors.
While there are serious problems with the SEC proposals, we do feel
that the issue of auditor independence is so important that any
opportunity

for

realistic

discussion

of the

fact

of

independence

and the public’s perception of it is useful.

The

final

report

of the

Cohen Commission has

just been released.

It raises such issues as the adverse effects of extreme competition

within the profession, the adverse effects of time pressures on audit

quality, and the desirability of professional schools of accounting.
I

do

not

pretend that

all the questions are close to resolution,

nor do I think an apology is necessary.

cated as they are important.

These matters are as compli

For example, it is easy to say that the

independence and reliability of an audit are enhanced when the

auditing firm regularly changes the partner handling the audit, to
get a ’’fresh look.”

This type of approach is far easier for a

hundred-partner firm to cope with than a five-partner firm.

I use

this example to show that the process of balancing various consider
ations - such as the need for investor protection and the need to

preserve smaller firms’ ability to practice - is not simple.

Will the changes already made and the new organization of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants deal effectively

with the issue of discipline?
The issue of discipline can only be resolved in the context of a

shared responsibility.

To preserve the ability to regulate itself
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and to retain the public’s confidence in that process, the profession

needs public oversight and procedures for disciplining those few CPAs
or firms who do not maintain high standards.

There are two separate

aspects of professional discipline. The first is the steps taken to
prevent audit failures by establishing high standards of quality and

performance in auditing publicly owned companies.

The second aspect

centers on procedures that apply when an audit firm does not properly
discharge its responsibilities in a particular case - when an audit
failure occurs.

The

AICPA’s

new SEC Practice Section is now working on the first

aspect - preventive mechanisms to assure quality in the auditing of

public companies.

The Section’s Executive Committee and its Public

Oversight Board will set the standards that must be applied in

practice by member firms.

In addition, a program of peer reviews -

actually testing whether the procedures set forth by the Section are

applied in the conduct of audits - is now being developed.

The

Section also will have the responsibility to impose sanctions on any
members who do not take appropriate corrective action for weaknesses
revealed by peer review.

there will

be a procedure

In addition it is my understanding that

for special peer review where there is

substantial evidence that a breakdown in quality control has occurred.

The second aspect relates to action to be taken when an audit failure
occurs.

The SEC now has responsibility for investigating audit

failures and appropriately disciplining those involved - either

in the management of the company or in the auditing firm.
is the proper body for exercising these functions.
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The SEC

I recommend

that it continue to retain the sole responsibility for action in the

case of audit failures.
This

division of responsibility for professional discipline allows

the profession to shoulder its full share of activities - standard
setting, peer review, and enforcing adherence to standards. The SEC

will retain the duty to act when the public is affected by a break
down in the audit process.

The Institute role then is properly one

while the SEC role is one of a regulator with full

of prevention,

authority to investigate and take punitive action.

Despite the steps already taken, are there significant concerns re

maining in the area of auditor independence?
Financial statements are an integral part of our economic system.

An

independent audit of the information presented by management is
essential for the public interest, and it is also important that the
public be satisfied that the auditor is independent.

The introduction of the corporate audit committee has been a powerful

and progressive development that goes a long way toward bolstering

the auditor’s

independence,

both in appearance and in fact.

When

disputes arise, it is easier for an auditor to defend his objectivity

where the client has an active audit committee consisting of non
management

outside

suggestion that

I

am concerned,

however,

with the

auditors require their clients to form audit com

mittees of outside
fication.

directors.

directors as a condition for continuing certi

To the contrary,

I believe that the establishment of
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audit

committees must be formally mandated by the SEC, not by the

auditor.

To begin with, my lawyers advised me that the SEC’s present authority
to make accountants impose such a requirement is very doubtful; more

over, if the profession were to do this without Government authority,

we might run into antitrust problems as well as questions regarding
directors’

liability.

Aside from this, there would be serious ad
The SEC and the accounting profession

verse adverse side effects.

are in agreement that the independent auditor should not intrude into

the area of the client’s fundamental management responsibility.
quote the SEC in Accounting Series Release No.

126,

To

dated July 5,

1972:
”A part of the rationale which underlies any
rule on independence is that managerial and
decision-making functions are the responsi
bility of the client and not of the inde
pendent accountant.”

The separation of the accountant from the client’s internal manage
ment

functions

and decisions

accountant’s independence rests.

accountant
of its

parture

should

dictate

the

is the

foundation upon which the

The suggestion that the independent
client’s

decision

on

establishment

corporate structure represents a sharp and unjustified de
from this

suggestion that

all

tradition

of

separation

accountants must

and

independence.

The

so intrude on their clients*

policy decisions, would fundamentally alter the very nature of the
client-accountant relationship.

Obviously it would not be enough to say,

committee."

’’You must have an audit

The requirement, to accomplish anything, would have to
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include, at a minimum, a definition of "independent outside director."
The

very

thought

of

an

independent

auditor establishing the cri

teria of director independence is deeply disturbing.

In our view,

the SEC should, in the public interest, mandate audit

and

committees

provide

the

criteria and

the broad guidelines

for

The audit committee should have the power of

their operation.

review over the auditors,

adequacy of work,

encompassing fees,

scope of service,

review of the results of the examination as

well as dismissal, if appropriate.
Another area of concern is whether the performance of a broad range

of professional services undermines the auditor’s independence.

The

practice of having public accountants provide consulting services is

rooted

in sound,

long-standing tradition.

While the larger firms

have identified and structured the activity more formally,

smaller

firms have always regarded these consulting services as an integral
part of their practice.
It is natural for a company to look to its accounting firm for as

sistance

in

improving

systems

and controls.

It

expects,

with

justification, that the accounting firm has a special understanding
When an accounting firm satisfies

of its information system needs.
this need,

the company

is helped

in several ways:

the company

receives the benefits of the firm’s skills to improve its system and
the

information generated may facilitate the audit process.

Per

haps more important, as systems grow increasingly complex, with
sophisticated computer installations,
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the early involvement of the

auditor in systems design will reduce the cost of providing ap

propriate audit safeguards and audit controls.

The role of the

auditor is expanding, and the performance of a modern audit requires
a broad range of skills.

The General Accounting Office, the account

ing arm of the Congress, has taken the initiative in broadening the
auditor’s role, calling upon engineers, economists,

and even social

scientists to assist in its work.

Our experience is that the interaction of auditors and specialists
has significantly raised our auditors’ level of sensitivity and

This interaction may involve computer specialists,

sophistication.
systems

designers,

inventory control specialists,

or actuaries who

measure pension liabilities.

Any restriction on our ability to practice on a broad basis will
reduce our capacity to attract the high-caliber people we con
sider essential.

We have found in interviewing at schools across

the country that applicants,

especially at the graduate school

level, are excited and challenged by the opportunity to participate

in a broad

and diverse practice.

practice will make

it

Narrowing our current

more difficult

scope of

for our Firm and indeed our

profession to keep pace in maintaining audit quality in a rapidly
changing environment.

Various studies - including one conducted by the Cohen Commission -

have consistently shown that consulting services have no adverse ef

fect on audit independence.

a minority.

This concern has been expressed only by

In view of this,

we think it appropriate that all
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information

on

services

performed

for clients be

evaluated by

audit committees and that the proxy include a statement by the audit

committee that they have reviewed all services performed by the
auditor and are satisfied as to his independence.

Since much of the criticism has centered on the appearance rather
than the fact of independence,
many of these concerns.

barring

the

auditor

our recommendations would eliminate

This would certainly be preferable to

from utilizing

needed

skills

and

pushing the

profession back to the green eyeshade days.

Is the existing structure for the establishment of auditing standards

adequate?

I believe that changes are required to broaden participation in
the standard-setting process.

Our proposal would permit the audit

ing profession to be more responsive to user expectations.

I

recommend

that

the

function

of establishing auditing

standards

be assumed by a small, full-time panel under the auspices of an
independent body - the Financial Accounting Foundation.

This panel

should be drawn from the public accounting profession, academia, and
user groups;
fessional

and it should be supported by a highly competent pro

staff.

In addition,

I propose that the panel draw upon

experienced auditors in active practice to form small task forces to

assist on implementation issues.

These voluntary task force members

can provide practical assistance to panel and staff.
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With

this

financial

type

of organization,

representatives

analysts and Government accountants,

participate in the development of new standards.

of user groups

-

for example - could

At the same time,

this independent organization would be free of any bias that might be

perceived in the present AICPA structure.

It could tap the expertise

resident in both large and small accounting firms that are now unable

to participate fully in the standard-setting process.

I believe this

feature - involving smaller accounting firms - is significant.
What impact will changes already made and under consideration have on

smaller firms?
The accounting profession is not just the eight largest or the fif

teen largest

It is thousands of firms reaching into every

firms.

city and town and serving small businesses as well as corporate
giants.

It

is in the public interest to protect the viability of

the smaller firms,

which perform critically important functions

for American business.

It has been suggested that some of the changes proposed for the
accounting profession may adversely affect the smaller firms.

include:

These

lifting the restrictions on advertising, open solicitation

of clients as well as partners and staffs of others, disclosure of a

firm’s financial data,

rules on rotation of partners on an engage

ment, required peer review, required continuing education, the audit
committee, and proposed limitations on scope of practice.

Removing

existing

bans

on

advertising

and

solicitation might

put

the medium and small firms at a substantial competitive disadvantage
10

because of the disparity in resources available to them in contrast

to those available to larger firms.
Similarly,

a

requirement

for more complete financial reporting

could subject the smaller firms to unfavorable comparisons.

I

recognize that the disclosure of certain financial information,

such as having a large proportion of the firm’s income derived
from a single client and the amount of insurance coverage in force,

may be appropriate or even essential.

In addition some prospective

clients might be unduly influenced by disparities in firm size;

thus disclosure

of gross

fees or

at a competitive disadvantage.

profits

could

put

smaller firms

Sheer firm size is not necessarily

an indication of quality and should not be the criterion by which

firms are judged.

Certain

proposals

designed

to

ensure

auditor

independence

improve audit quality may adversely affect the smaller firms.

and
The

proposals for rotation of partners on an engagement, for peer review,
and for continuing education,

fit in this category.

gesting that these rules not be adopted.

I am not sug

The rules are needed to

protect the public interest, but at the same time it is essential to

find a way to lessen the impact on smaller firms.
The requirements for peer review and continuing education might be
specially modified in the case of a CPA firm with only one or two

I suggest that the review process

publicly owned company clients.

might be applied only to those procedures and controls utilized in

the audit of public companies.

Similarly, the requirements for
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continuing education might apply only to the personnel assigned to
While providing special rules makes

the audit of public companies.

the task more difficult, the benefit - protecting the smaller firms’

ability to practice - seems to be worth the cost.
On the subject of audit committees, we have heard it said that the

audit

committee review may somehow result

in a transfer of client

accounts from smaller firms to larger ones. This is mere speculation.
We would hope and expect that audit committees would put the emphasis

exactly where it should be - on quality performance.
believe that,

upon reflection, most

It is my

smaller firms will opt for

meeting the same standards as those established for the larger firms.

Nevertheless, alternatives must be considered.
Small firms should be able to retain their clients as these clients

grow and go public,

providing they do not compromise the standards

on which the public depends.

In the spirit of support, we have

worked ’’behind the scenes” with many smaller firms in providing

technical
guidance

assistance

in the application of auditing standards,

in meeting SEC requirements,

and consultation

in helping

them carry out difficult auditing assignments.
We have also shared our technical expertise broadly through the
publication of the definitive auditing text,

Montgomery’s Auditing,

which we have published in nine editions since 1913.

In fact,

we were asked - and offered - in a recent instance to provide our
publications, training materials,
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and even our technical consulting

assistance to an association of smaller firms on a very reasonable

fee basis.

Continuing in this spirit,

I propose that the new organization of

firms practicing before the SEC address the problem by setting up a
board of qualified practitioners to provide this type of consulting

This help could be extended to include a

help to smaller firms.

review of public company engagements in those cases where rotation of
the partner is not practical.

Recognizing that there are difficult

issues inherent in this proposal, I hope they could be resolved and
this board

could operate in a support

role without

disturbing an

existing auditor-client relationship.
Are additional steps warranted to give the public greater assurance

of audit quality worldwide?
The question has been raised as to how an auditing firm can maintain
the same high standards of quality control all around the world.

International

Firm

implemented

has

a

establishing audit procedures worldwide.

series

of policy

Our

statements

The procedures must be fol

lowed in all work, whether international or purely domestic in nature.
In Coopers & Lybrand,

auditing performed anywhere in the world is

done on a uniform basis,

and we conduct international peer reviews

to satisfy ourselves that our offices around the world are complying
with established policies and procedures.

Recognizing the current

interest in internal control and building on the Coopers & Lybrand

approach,

which

presently

field

is

systems oriented,

testing

a

document
13

we have compiled and

known

as

the

are

Internal Control

This document is a practical tool which details

Reference Manual.

the circumstances that can give rise to a weakness in internal
It will also provide an effective tool to meet the require

control.

ments of the recently enacted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
In addition to our internal peer review program,

our International

Firm has prepared training materials, translated into the principal

languages,

are in use worldwide.

that

Our International Firm has

also arranged hundreds of staff exchanges to promote understanding
of, and sensitivity to, conditions in other countries.

We

are

confident

practice

is

These are not
entities

that

procedures

these

conducted

according

empty words.

in most

countries,

to

ensure that

uniformly

our worldwide

high

standards.

Even though there are separate legal

we have adopted a policy of assuming

responsibility in the United States for work performed for a U. S.
client by our International Firm anywhere in the world.
PROGRESS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Reform of our profession

is well underway.

We have already made

substantial progress and have demonstrated our determination to work

vigorously until fair and practicable solutions are found.
important

underlying

factor

The most

is that this is being accomplished by

self-regulation.
Assistance and oversight from Government, through the SEC and this

Subcommittee,

are needed.

Although the SEC already performs in

the area of audit failures, its responsibility, in our opinion,
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should be extended to cover the required establishment of audit
committees.

You have created a climate for reform in the private sector.

We

have responded to your call and will accomplish in an orderly way

all of the improvements in quality and performance which are required

in the public interest.
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STATEMENT OF JOHN C. BURTON BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
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My name is John C. Burton

I am professor of accounting and finance

at The Columbia University Graduate School of Business.

From 1972 to 1976

I served as Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission

and from 1976 until the end of 1977 I was Deputy Mayor for Finance of the
City of New York.
I appreciate having the opportunity to express my views to the Sub
committee on the important subject of these hearings.

Because I believe

the role of the accounting profession is a vital one in our capital market
system, I think it is essential that an institutional structure be estab
lished for the profession that will provide the public with assurance
that this role is being performed both responsibly and effectively.

Such

a structure will also offer institutional stability to the profession and
will permit it to devote its considerable talents to developing innovative

approaches to auditing rather than to legal matters.
•Unfortunately, I do not believe that the new divisional structure

created by the AICPA and described to you earlier in these hearings is

adequate to provide either effective surveillance over accounting practice
or the institutional stability required by the profession.

While it is a

significant step forward compared to the previous efforts of the AICPA
at professional discipline and many of its characteristics may be utilized

in the development of an effective system of professional self regulation,
in the final analysis I believe that the AICPA system taken as a whole
must be characterized as insufficient.

There are at least six reasons why the AICPA program is not likely to

achieve its objectives or meet the public need.

They are as follows :
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1.

The AICPA does not have the legal authority to achieve effective

surveillance and discipline over the profession.

If its sanctions are

to be effective, they are very likely to constitute violation of the
anti-trust laws as restraints on competition.

In addition, the rights

of all parties to legal due process make it likely that the AICPA sanc
tions could be successfully challenged in court and that professionals
who work on reviews which lead to sanctions might be held personally
subject to legal action.

2.

Even if the AICPA's system were to survive legal attacks, the sanc

tions imposed would lack the force of law and if the S.E.C. were to im

pose its sanctions on an offending firm, it would have to perform its
own investigation and cite the firm under a Rule 2(c) or other formal

proceeding.

This would mean that an offending firm would be legally

free to continue to practice before the Commission for an extended time

while a second set of proceedings was completed.

3.

In addition to the legal problems associated with a private surveillance

mechanism, there are serious problems of public perception which will
exist.

The AICPA program, under which major accounting firms will review

each other, is likely to be seen as a process of mutual back-scratching.

While a prestigious group of persons will be gathered to serve as a
Public Oversight Board, it is highly doubtful that a part time group can

either in fact or perception provide" an effective substitute for statu
tory regulation” as the AICPA contends.

4.

The AICPA program does not deal with the major problems of enormous

legal costs, delay and legal obstruction which face plaintiffs
where they seek to recover damages from accountants.

in cases

It is essential

that the process created provide for a means of making prompt administra
tive determinations of professional culpability in cases where investor
losses occur which can be related to deficient financial reporting.

-35.

The AICPA program does not provide for an auditing or peer review

standard setting process which includes both participation by those
without self interest in the development of standards and review of

standards by a governmental body.
of S.E.C. practice division

The governing body of the AICPA

is the Executive Committee which is made

up of representatives of the firms with S.E.C. practice.

While the

Public Oversight Board may review, recommend and publicize, the standard

setting of the Division is still the responsibility of the Executive
Committee.

Auditing standard setting is currently the responsibility

of the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, another AICPA committee.

While changes may result from the report of the Commission on Auditor
Responsibility, formal authority for oversight by the S.E.C. ( such as

exists by statute in the case of accounting standard setting) is not

likely to be a part of any process developed by the AICPA,

6.

A private sector process such as that envisaged by the AICPA does

not affect the potential liability of CPA firms.

Unlimited liability

which exists today raises the stakes of potential actions for damages

and this leads to protracted litigation

investors are the principal winners.

in which counsel rather than

In addition, unlimited liability

substantially deters innovation in auditing and the development of new
services by auditors such as limited reviews, reports on internal
controls and others which may provide great benefit to investors. Un
limited liability also tends to reduce competition in the profession

by making it harder for small firms with limited assets and insurance

coverage to compete with major firms,

While no one would suggest that

liability should be eliminated, and I personally believe that a simple
negligence standard should be sufficient to impose it, I do believe that

a limitation on liability based on a multiple of perhaps ten times

-4aggregate fees paid to an independent accountant on an engagement
would provide sufficient deterrence to deficient professional work
and a significant contribution to the loss of damaged investors while

avoiding the adverse consequences to the public which flow from the
existence of unlimited liability.

As can be seen from the above list, the insufficiency of the AICPA

program does not result primarily from the unwillingness of the accounting

profession to design an effective system but rather from the inadequacy
of its authority to do so.

The efforts of the profession in the past

year suggest that it is willing to step forward.

This indicates that

a system of formal self regulation under federal oversight is likely to
be successful and direct federal regulation of the profession will not

be necessary.
I recommend, therefore, that legislation be enacted which would
create such a formal self regulatory system.

The legislation should

authorize the creation and registration with the S.E.C. of a self
regulatory body which would be a private sector institution subject to

the oversight of the Commission.

The governing body of this organiza

tion would be a Board of Directors, half of whose members would be
accountants practicing before the S.E.C. and half public members drawn
from the business, financial, professional and academic communities.

Membership in the organization would be a condition for practice
before the Commission.

Membership would be by firm and all member

firm partners would have to be associated members and hence subject

to its jurisdiction.

Membership would also provide protection from

unlimited liability but at the same time members would be required to
submit to an administrative process which would simplify substantially

the process of bringing a complaint and seeking damages for professional
deficiencies.

-5The registered organization would be required to perform five
principal functions:
1)

The registration of firms and associated members, including a process

for making certain information about registrants publicly available.

This would require the creation of a registration form which describes
the firm, its clientelle, its quality control procedures, its associated
members, and certain financial information.

ically.

This would be updated period

The registration process ultimately should also include some

periodically filed evidence of competence beyond state CPA licensing

requirements and may require such institutional changes as outside
directors and independent auditors or the equivalent for registered

firms.

2)

The establishment of standards for auditing and other aspects of

professional practice.
Standard setting should include both auditing standards and

standards of professional practice.

The former would deal with problems

of audit verification and reporting while the latter would include

problems of ethics, business conduct, quality control, staff supervision,
and other areas which affect the public.

The process of standard

setting should be the primary responsibility of a standard setting

board which would include public representation.

Extensive participa

tion by all interested persons should be part of the process, including
an exposure period for public comment before final standards are issued.

After standards are issued by this board, they will be reviewed by the
Board of Directors which will have the right to return them to the

standard setting board for further consideration.
be reviewed and approved by the S.E.C.

Standards will then

-63)

The regular surveillance of practice of its member firms.

Surveillance would be accomplished by conducting regular reviews of

the practice of its member firms.

These reviews would be made both by

the organization’s own professional staff and by professionals in public
practice under its supervision.

If the results of a review were not

satisfactory, the matter would be referred to the enforcement function

for appropriate remedial or disciplinary steps.
4)

Investigation of professional deficiencies and institution of

disciplinary proceedings, with appropriate due process protection.

The organization would have the authority to investigate professional
deficiencies uncovered by its own surveillance and claim resolution func

tions or referred to it by the S.E.C. or the public.
maintain an investigative staff.

To do this, it would

This staff would have the authority to

compel testimony and the submission of documents from any member firm or
associated member subject to the penalties of perjury and upon pain of
dismissal from the organization for refusal to testify.

Testimony and

documents could be obtained from others with the protection of confiden

tiality.

Where formal subpoena power is needed, the matter can be referred

to the S.E.C. for governmental enforcement action or for the authoriza
tion of joint investigations with the S.E.C. enforcement staff.

The

organization’s staff would be legally immunized from liability resulting

from performing their investigative function.

The investigations staff would present its investigative results and
its recommendation for disciplinary action to the Board of Directors for

action.

The Board would have the authority to impose substantial fines

for disciplinary purposes as well as to suspend members and associate

members from membership ( and hence from practice before the S.E.C.)

either temporarily or permanently.

In addition, the Board could order

any other specific remedies which it deemed appropriate in particular

-7-

circumstances.

All Board determinations would be subject to S.E.C. over

sight and to appeal to the Commission by affected parties after the deter

mination had been made public.

Further appeal to the Federal Court of

Appeals after the S.E.C. review would also be possible.
5)

The resolution of claims for damages made against members.

This would require the creation of an administrative procedure to

simplify the process of making claims for damages against accountants arising

out of deficient professional work.

Included would be claim investigation

in order to gather necessary facts, a presentation of the facts in a sys

tematic report, and a professional evaluation and recommended resolution
to any claim brought.

This claim investigation function could be utilized

either as the final resolution of a claim or by either party in a law suit

to provide a professional evaluation of the merits of a case.

would be admissible in a Court of Law.

The report

A member would be required to

participate in the process at the request of a claimant, although the

member would have the ability to appeal any determination to the S.E.C.
and ultimately to the Court of Appeals.
If such an administrative process were in place to simplify the

currently enormously complex process of bringing a case against accountants,
it might be consistent with public policy to limit the liability of
accountants under the securities laws to ten times fees in the absence

of demonstrable intent to deceive.

The ideas which I have expressed here today are only an outline of a
self regulatory program.

I have developed these ideas in somewhat more

detail in a paper which I am submitting for the record.
If the approach is to be successful, the organization which would be

established to perform the self regulatory functions is of paramount im
portance.

It must be highly professional, offer a rewarding and remuner

ative career path for staff and draw extensively upon the participation of
members.

The member role must be real and effective.

If such an organiza

-8tion can be established, the partnership provided by a formal self
regulatory mechanism is one which offers substantial benefits.

In summary, it is my view that a formal self regulatory

approach

is one which offers both public protection and institutional stability

for the accounting profession.

I am a great supporter of the profession

and I believe that it has a major role to play in our economic society.
For it to play that role effectively, it must have the tools to police

itself and the oversight to provide continuing assurance that the public

is being fully protected.

I urge that the legislative process to provide

both tools and oversight be promptly undertaken.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAROLD M. WILLIAMS, CHAIRMAN,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

February 1, 1978

Mr. Chairman,

and members of the

Subcommittee, I

APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN THE SUBCOMMITTEE THIS

MORNING AND TO PARTICIPATE

IN

ITS CONSIDERATION OF AN

APPROPRIATE SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR THE ACCOUNTING
profession.

Accountants play a

key

role

in the capital

FORMATION PROCESS ON WHICH AMERICAN BUSINESS RESTS AND

ARE VITAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

THAT PROCESS-

IN

BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT COMMISSION

REGISTRATION STATEMENTS AND PERIODIC REPORTS

FINANCIAL INFORMATION,

INCLUDE AUDITED

INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS EXERCISE

SIGNIFICANT CONTROL OVER CORPORATE ACCESS TO CAPITAL FROM

THE

INVESTING PUBLIC AND, THUS,

AREA OF THE COMMISSION'S

OCCUPY A UNIQUE ROLE

RESPONSIBILITIES-

IN THE

WHILE ACCOUNTANTS

-2CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE GUARANTORS OF THE ACCURACY OF

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, THEIR ROLE ENCOMPASSES A CRITICAL

APPRAISAL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENTS STEWARDSHIP

RESPONSIBILITIES, WHETHER THE ISSUE IS THE LEVEL OF

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETECTION OF MANAGEMENT MISCONDUCT, THE

APPROVAL OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN APPLICABLE ACCOUNTING

PRINCIPLES, OR THE EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS.

My

testimony before the late

Senator Metcalf's

SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUNE 23, 1977, SETS FORTH THE COMMIS
SION'S VIEWS REGARDING THE IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING THE

ACCOUNTING PROFESSION.

In ADDITION, I CONTINUED TO

ADDRESS MANY OF THESE ISSUES IN THREE SUBSEQUENT SPEECHES
-- MY REMARKS LAST SUMMER AT THE MEETING OF THE CALIFORNIA

CPA Society

which

Chairman Moss also

addressed;

my talk

SEVERAL MONTHS AGO AT THE SEAVIEW SYMPOSIUM; AND MY

SPEECH LAST MONTH AT THE AICPA FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

-3Current SEC Developments.

I

understand that copies of those

FOUR DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE,

AND

I WILL NOT BURDEN YOUR RECORD WITH A RESTATEMENT OF THEIR

CONTENT THIS MORNING-

I WOULD, HOWEVER.

LIKE TO STRESS ONE

FUNDAMENTAL, OVER-RIDING POINT FROM THOSE MATERIALS BEFORE

TURNING TO WHAT I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE CHIEF AREA OF CONCERN

in the

Subcommittee's current proceedings -- professional

SELF-REGULATION.

Independence -ATTITUDE --

In

in fact,

in appearance,

and

in mental

IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WORK OF THE OUTSIDE AUDITOR-

many ways, the public has expectations of the profession

AND OF WHAT THE AUDITOR'S REPORT MEANS THAT EXCEED REALITY-

TO THE EXTENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE AUDITING

PROCESS AS A WHOLLY UNBIASED REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT'S

PRESENTATION OF THE CORPORATE FINANCIAL PICTURE,

I

BELIEVE THAT

THE EXPECTATIONS ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED AND MUST BE FULLY MET-

-4-

Independence

is the auditor's single most valuable attribute

— indeed, it

is

perhaps the single attribute which justifies

THE EXISTENCE OF ACCOUNTING AS A SEPARATE PROFESSION-

If THE

PROFESSION CANNOT SATISFY ITS OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN BOTH THE

APPEARANCE AND THE FACT OF INDEPENDENCE,

I

SUSPECT THAT

LEGISLATION IS INEVITABLE-

With that

thought

in mind,

I

would like to devote the

BALANCE OF MY PREPARED REMARKS TO SOME BRIEF OBSERVATIONS

CONCERNING THE A ICPA'S

INITIATIVE AT PROFESSIONAL SELF

REGULATION -- the Division of CPA firms and the related

SEC Practice Section-

At

the outset,

IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIS TWO POINTS-

I

think

it

FIRST, WHILE A NUMBER

OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAM ARE CRITICAL, THE KEY TO
THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE AICPA'S EFFORT LIES WITH THE

Public Oversight Board. It

is the

Board

which will set the

PACE AND TONE OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION'S ACTIVITIES AND

-5WHICH WILL DETERMINE HOW AGGRESSIVELY, EVEN-HANDEDLY , AND

THOROUGHLY THOSE ACTIVITIES ARE PURSUED.

WITHOUT A STRONG,

INDEPENDENT, AND OUTSPOKEN PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD,

I

DO NOT

BELIEVE THAT THE AICPA PROPOSALS WILL BE VIABLE-

Second, in order to give

the

AICPA's

efforts a fair

CHANCE, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THE PROFESSION SHOULD

NOW BE ALLOWED SOME TIME FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

PROGRAM IT HAS PROPOSED.

WILL HAVE THIS

In THE COMING MONTHS, THE COMMISSION

INITIATIVE AT VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION

UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY AND WILL LOOK TO THE RESULTS ACHIEVED

AS THE BASIS FOR FORMING JUDGMENTS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE

PROGRAM'S ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS-

As THE SUBCOMMITTEE

IS

AWARE, THE COMMISSION HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO REPORT TO

Congress on July 1, 1978, concerning

the profession's overall

EFFORTS TO MEET THE CONCERNS WHICH CONGRESS AND OTHERS HAVE

RAISED DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS-

A REVIEW OF THE

-6DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION WILL

CERTAINLY BE A MAJOR PART OF THAT REPORT.

WHILE JULY 1, MAY

BE TOO EARLY TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION CONCERNING THE
INITIATIVE,

1

BELIEVE THAT WE WILL BE

IN A MUCH BETTER POSTURE

TO JUDGE ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS AT THAT TIMEIN STRESSING THAT THE PROFESSION SHOULD BE GIVEN AN

OPPPORTUNITY TO

IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM

IT HAS PROPOSED.

NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT THE COMMISSION

WITH THAT PROGRAM-

Olson,
VIEWS

the

LAST SEPTEMBER,

AICPA's president, I

DO

IS WHOLLY SATISFIED

IN A LETTER TO WALLACE E.

communicated the

Commission's

IN THIS AREA, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE

HAS A COPY OF THAT LETTER-

the

I

Commission's

I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY

two major areas of concern-

First, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO GIVE
the

SAID

Public Oversight Board decision-making authority.
IN MY LETTER TO Mr. OLSON, THE COMMISSION,

As I

BASED ON

ITS

-7EXPERIENCE WITH SELF-REGULATION

IN OTHER AREAS, BELIEVES THAT

ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL AREAS OF WEAKNESS CENTERS

AROUND THE POSSIBILITY OF DOMINATION OF THE ORGANIZATION BY

ONE OR MORE OF THE MAJOR FIRMS.

THE MAJOR FIRMS

IN THE

ACCOUNTING PROFESSION WILL ENJOY AUTOMATIC FIRM MEMBERSHIP ON

the

Executive Committee and, in

appoint the

turn,

Peer Review Committee.

that committee will

This

WILL BE COUPLED WITH FIRM PEER REVIEW.

ONE LARGE FIRM TO CRITICIZE ANOTHER

QUESTION AND,

selection process

THE WILLINGNESS OF

IS OPEN TO SERIOUS

IN ANY EVENT, THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION MAY BE

ONE OF A LACK OF OBJECTIVITY, REGARDLESS OF THE REALITY-

For

these reasons, the

Public Oversight Board

Commission believes

that the

should have direct responsibility

FOR CONDUCTING PEER REVIEWS AND DETERMINING APPROPRIATE
sanctions.

THIS.

Thus far the AICPA has been

In accord

with our suggestions,

unwilling to do

the

Institute

did

-8HOWEVER, MODIFY

ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION CREATING THE BOARD TO

REQUIRE BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND PEER REVIEW COMMITTEES TO

CONSULT WITH THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

IN THE COURSE OF

THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS.

This

requirement for consultation acknowledges the

influence

THAT THE BOARD MUST HAVE, AND I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT

Section

the

structured.

cannot function effectively as

Nonetheless,

the

it

is

now

Commission still believes that

direct authority would enhance the

Board's

prospects

for

success.

A SECOND MATTER WHICH THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THE AICPA
SHOULD FULLY ADDRESS

MOST VITAL ASPECTS OF
REVIEW PROGRAM.

AS

I

IS THE INTENDED SCOPE OF ONE OF THE

ITS

INITIATIVE -- THE MANDATORY PEER

IN MY JUDGMENT, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES,

SUGGESTED A MOMENT AGO,

IS WHETHER THE REVIEW SHOULD BE

FIRM-ON-FIRM, AS CONTRASTED TO BEING DIRECTED BY THE PEER

-9REVIEW COMMITTEE OR THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD.

CON

SIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO WHETHER THE STAFF

PERFORMING THE REVIEWS SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS FROM

OUTSIDE THE PROFESSION.

THE QUESTION HERE BECOMES ONE OF

BALANCING THE BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE ENHANCEMENT OF

OBJECTIVITY

OR AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF OBJECTIVITY

AGAINST THE INCREASED COST AND INEFFICIENCIES,

IF ANY, OF

SUCH A REVIEW PROCESS-

There

are other important

issues concerning the scope

OF PEER REVIEWS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED.

FOR EXAMPLE,

AUTOMATIC EXCLUSION OF CASES IN LITIGATION

FROM THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW COULD PLACE A MAJOR CLOUD

OVER THE REVIEW PROCESS AND, AT A MINIMUM, RAISES A

AND COMPLEX PROBLEM TO WHICH THE PROFESSION MUST

AFFORD SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

While I RECOGNIZE THE

VERY DIFFICULT OBSTACLES TO PEER REVIEW OF PROBLEM OR

-10LITIGATED AUDITS, SUCH AUDITS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM

REVIEW WITHOUT DEVELOPING SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVES

DESIGNED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED

IN THAT

AUDIT WERE SYMPTOMATIC OF A WEAKNESS IN THE FIRM'S QUALITY

CONTROL SYSTEM.

WHOLESALE EXCLUSION OF PROBLEM AUDITS

WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE

PEER REVIEW PROCESS-

TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE SCOPE OF REVIEWS MUST ALSO GO

CONSIDERABLY BEYOND THAT ORIGINALLY DESIGNED IN CONNECTION

WITH THE VOLUNTARY REVIEW PROGRAM.

THE AICPA HAS RECOGNIZED

THIS FACT AND IS NOW REVIEWING THE CHANGES WHICH SHOULD BE
IMPLEMENTED IN THE SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM-

THE COMMISSION

WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW WHICH THE

Institute ultimately

requires

in order to satisfy itself

THAT NO MATERIAL AREAS ARE OMITTED.

THE COMMISSION

PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS

IS

-11ENCOMPASS BOTH A FIRM'S PROCEDURES FOR INTER-OFFICE

COORDINATION IN THE CASE OF AUDITS

INVOLVING MORE THAN

ONE OFFICE, AND THE MECHANISMS WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL

ACCOUNTING FIRMS EMPLOY TO ASSURE QUALITY CONTROL IN THE

FOREIGN SEGMENTS OF THEIR PRACTICE-

The Commission

believes that it

is appropriate and

DESIRABLE THAT THE AICPA BE GIVEN A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO

INSTITUTE EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION BEFORE CONGRESS CONSIDERS

THE

IMPOSITION OF OTHER FORMS OF REGULATION-

In THAT

CONNECTION, THIS SUBCOMMITTEE'S HEARINGS PROVIDE A VALUABLE

VEHICLE FOR EMPHASIZING TO THE PROFESSION THE IMPORTANCE WHICH

Congress attaches to its efforts and the fact that
EFFECTIVE ACTION

IS ESSENTIAL.

prompt and

DURING THE COMING MONTHS, THE

Commission intends to do everything within

its power to continue

TO CONVEY THAT SAME SENSE OF URGENCY AND TO HELP TO PROMOTE THE

-12EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION.

the

Commission

and

Congress

PRESSURE FROM BOTH

serves to create a countervailing

FORCE TO OFFSET THE CLIENT AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH
UNDERSTANDABLY AND SUBTLY IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION.

OF COUNTERVAILING TENSION IS,

THIS SORT

IN MY JUDGMENT, THE ESSENCE OF

EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE CONGRESSIONAL AND COMMISSION OVERSIGHT

OF THE PROFESSION-

The AICPA

must show willingness and ability to transform

ITSELF INTO A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT SELF-REGULATORY BODY

CAPABLE OF

IMPOSING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REFORMS AND

DISCIPLINE UPON

ITS MEMBERSHIP-

As

I MENTIONED EARLIER, THE

Commission will report to Congress on progress toward that
goal on

July 1, 1978.

measuring the

The

The

criteria against which we will be

AICPA's program

ability of the

of self-regulation will

Public Oversight Board

FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY.

to

include

--

-13-

The

thoroughness, quality, and

independence of

THE MANDATORY PEER REVIEW PROGRAM.

The Executive Committee's

record of meaningful

RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS PRESENTED TO IT BY

Public Oversight Board
Committee-

the

and the

Peer Review

Development OF AN EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINARY
STRUCTURE-

The profession's response, whether through the
Division of CPA firms or some other appropriate
VEHICLE, TO THE COHEN COMMISSION'S FINAL

RECOMMENDATIONS-

And, most
-- AS

importantly, the profession's success

individuals,

firms, and a professional

ORGANIZATION -- IN ENHANCING, AS PART OF ITS
PROCESS, THE VITAL INGREDIENT OF

INDEPENDENCE-

While independence has many aspects, one of
THE KEYSTONES,

IN MY JUDGMENT,

IS ACTION TO

CREATE A PROFESSIONAL STANDARD REQUIRING
INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEES

IN PUBLIC

COMPANIES-

The Commission strongly supports

the goal of fostering

A STRONG PRIVATE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION CAPABLE OF PROVIDING
THE PUBLIC WITH

INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE AND VERIFICATION OF

-14THE FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY PUBLIC COMPANIES'
I

BELIEVE THAT THE PROFESSION IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE SELF"

REGULATION, AND THE COMMISSION INTENDS TO WORK ACTIVELY

WITH THE PROFESSION AND THE CONGRESS IN SUPPORTING THAT EFFORT.

This Subcommittee can be confident of

the

Commis

sion's CONTINUING CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

OF PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION

IN THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

AND OF OUR DESIRE TO WORK WITH THE CONGRESS AND THE

PROFESSION.

That concludes my

prepared statement, and

I would be

HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THE

Subcommittee may

have.

STATEMENT OF
JOHN C. BIEGLER
SENIOR PARTNER OF PRICE WATERHOUSE & CO.

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OF THE HEARINGS
ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS
95th Cong., 2d Sess.
January 30, 1978

On behalf of the United States firm of Price
Waterhouse & Co., I am pleased to set forth our views

on what we believe is the central issue that the Sub
committee on Oversight and Investigations will face

in its forthcoming hearings.

That issue is the quality

of the accounting profession’s audit practice — both
on a national and international level.

I.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

We believe that the plan of the American

Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is
an impressive initial step to assure the highest level

of audit practice in the United States.

While the AICPA

plan is not as far-reaching as we might have preferred,
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we strongly support that plan, will assist in its effec

tive implementation, and believe that it should be given
a reasonable opportunity to succeed.

The AICPA plan understandably concentrates on
the quality of audit practice in the United States.

But, comprehensive concern with audit quality must also
deal with the international aspects of an audit engage

ment.

Price Waterhouse has long been aware of the

need for international quality control programs.

The

experience of our firm has led us to the conclusion
that any firm conducting an international practice should

have an international quality control program that in
cludes the following elements:

(i)

Supervision and control by a U.S. firm

of all international audit engagements for U.S. clients

of that firm.

3

(ii)

The opportunity for review by a U.S.

firm of reports prepared abroad by its related firms
which will either be filed in the United States by such

related firms or relied upon by other accounting firms
in reporting upon financial statements filed in the
United States; and

(iii)

The creation of an international structure

of related firms to establish quality control standards
and monitor through periodic reviews the quality of
each related firm’s international audit practice.

Although it is possible that regulatory or other
initiatives may be required to implement this program,

certainly there are steps that firms with an inter
national practice can, and should, take unilaterally

and voluntarily.

Evaluation and consideration can also

be given to the possibility of expanding the AICPA’s

quality control review plan to recognize, to the extent
possible, these essential elements of responsible
international practice.

4

II.

THE AICPA PLAN DESERVES AN
OPPORTUNITY TO SUCCEED

Concern with the quality of audit practice was
reflected both in this Subcommittee’s earlier report

published in October 1976 and in the hearings held last

Spring before the Senate Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting and Management chaired by the late Senator
Metcalf.

Both Congressional panels identified an erosion

of public confidence in the accounting profession.

We at Price Waterhouse are deeply concerned
with any loss of confidence in our profession.

Confi

dence in the integrity and competence of the profession
is essential to the well-being of our nation’s economy.
As your Subcommittee correctly pointed out in its report,

"The auditor must perform in a manner that warrants

confidence."

We believe that over the years Price Waterhouse,
and the profession in general, have performed with inde
pendence and with a high level of professional skill.
Nevertheless, we recognize that there will always be
a continuing need for improvement.

After all, no matter
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how well the profession as a whole might perform, even

a single poor audit performance causes public disillu

sionment and harms the entire profession.

Of course,

some problems might be expected from the tremendous

number of audits that are conducted each year. But,
even a single audit failure is one too many if it could
reasonably have been prevented.

Testifying before Senator Metcalf’s Subcommittee

last Spring, I stressed the urgency for the profession
to develop imaginative new procedures to assure con

sistent, high quality work by all accounting firms and

to prevent, to the extent reasonably possible, audit
failures before they occur.

Accordingly, we proposed a challenging program

to maintain and upgrade the quality of work in the
accounting profession.

It would have involved direct

SEC oversight of periodic, in-depth peer reviews of

an accounting firm’s system for assuring the quality

of its audit practice.
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That proposal was hailed and criticized.

tedly, it was strong medicine.

Admit

But, it reflected our

commitment that the performance of our profession be

kept at the highest level possible and that public confi

dence in our work be maintained and strengthened.

The profession has responded impressively since
that time.

For example, the new SEC practice section

created within the AICPA will impose stringent standards

on member firms, including a requirement for periodic

peer reviews of each firm’s audit practice.

That plan,

as proposed, did not go as far as Price Waterhouse ini
tially preferred, but it does represent a constructive
response to proper public concerns.

Accordingly, Price

Waterhouse will participate in the plan.

Furthermore,

we will strive to help improve the plan, where possible,

to the end that it be as effective as possible.

We believe that any consideration of legislation

to regulate the profession should be stayed for a suf
ficient period of time to afford the AICPA plan the
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opportunity to succeed.

It has not yet had that

opportunity.

We are encouraged that as a critical first step

in making the plan effective, the profession has
attracted citizens of great stature and respect to serve
on the Public Oversight Board.

That Board’s efforts

will be fundamental to the success of the profession’s

efforts, and equally significant, to the public’s per

ception of the integrity and effectiveness of the plan.

III.

EXPANDED ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF AUDIT PRACTICE

There is one area, however, where there is need

for expanded attention — the international aspects

of audit engagements.

The profession’s plan, as we have said, is an
impressive step to assure that the quality of audit

practice is kept at a uniformly high level in the United
States.

But, any concern with audit quality today must

take into account the need for quality control standards
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on an international level.

As the Metcalf Subcommittee

Report, published last November, pointed out:

"Investors and the public in this
country have a direct interest in the
quality of auditing performed on
multinational corporations in other
countries."

Chairman Williams recently reemphasized that
point in an address to the profession:

"As American businesses have grown
into multinational corporations, the
need for achieving the same high level
of auditing standards in foreign
countries has grown commensurately.
Foreign operations today represent
a significant portion of the business
of many U.S. coprorations.
Investors
are entitled to expect and should
receive the same level of profes
sionalism and judgment from an
independent auditor in these foreign
countries as they expect and receive
in the United States."

We agree fully with those statements.

United

States investors have the right to expect that the
consolidated financial statements of a U.S. corporation
correctly reflect not only the corporation's operations

in the United States, but its operations in foreign
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countries as well.

And, the accounting firm reporting

on those statements must have procedures to assure that

the same high standards applied in auditing the corpora
tion’s activities in the United States are also applied

to its activities abroad.

Price Waterhouse has long recognized these

requirements.

Price Waterhouse & Co. was established in the

United Kingdom in 1849.

The U.S. firm was founded in

1890 and we have been involved in an international

practice for more than 85 years.

Today, worldwide,

the various Price Waterhouse firms have more than 1100

partners and 17,000 employees practicing in 89 countries.
There are 283 offices of Price Waterhouse firms across
the globe.

Price Waterhouse firms have long been committed
to a system of international quality control.

Through

this experience, we have developed a dual mechanism

to assure the quality of our international audit practice.

We have:
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(i) well-established standards to assure high

quality work on each multinational audit engagement,
wherever that work is performed; and

(ii) an international structure which establishes

uniform standards and monitors the quality of work on
an international level.

First, we have adopted specific procedures to
assure that each international audit engagement for
a United States multinational client is performed
according to U.S. accounting and auditing standards.

A United States firm partner is in charge of each audit
engagement for a United States client of the firm.
That partner has the responsibility to satisfy himself

that the entire audit — no matter where conducted or
by whom — is performed according to U.S. standards.

Any international audit for a United States

client, in short, is under the control of the U.S. firm
of Price Waterhouse & Co. which accepts full responsi
bility for its report on the consolidated financial
statements.
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There are other situations, however, where the
work of Price Waterhouse firms can have an impact in

the United States.

For example, a Price Waterhouse

firm abroad may report on the financial statements of

a foreign client which are filed with the SEC.

Or a

Price Waterhouse firm abroad may report on a subsidiary

of a United States corporation and that report is relied

upon by another accounting firm.

Our international

organization has recently instituted policies to ensure

that in these situations the reports of our related
firms are subject to review by the U.S. firm.

The second element in our quality control

mechanism is a strong international structure and sys
tematic arrangements to monitor and maintain the con
tinued high level of competence of all Price Waterhouse

firms.

Effective quality control procedures within

each Price Waterhouse firm are a primary feature of

our program.
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Price Waterhouse has long had an international
structure which has evolved over the years in response

to changing conditions in the world economy; its basic
mission is to provide an effective device to establish
and maintain high standards of practice on an inter
national level.

Therefore, the Price Waterhouse firms, at the

end of World War II, formalized a worldwide structure
through the establishment of an international partner

ship.

It was created to establish and maintain uniform

high standards of professional work and conduct among
all the individual Price Waterhouse practice firms.
This helps us to ensure the ability of each individual

Price Waterhouse firm to provide services of the highest
uniform quality to clients throughout the world.

Following more than 25 years of experience in
coordination and cooperation on an international level,

in 1973 the partners in each of the Price Waterhouse

firms joined together into a single worldwide partnership —
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Price Waterhouse International (PWI).

Decisions and

actions of PWI are taken by a General Council made up

of representatives of each of the Price Waterhouse firms.
The PWI Partnership Agreement authorizes the Council

to require the withdrawal of any PWI partner for pro
fessional misconduct, for willful failure to adhere

to PWI professional standards, and for other designated

conduct.

The PWI structure, with headquarters in London,
works effectively toward achieving an integrated
organization to continuously improve the quality of
professional services throughout the world.

It is under

the guidance of a full-time chairman and an executive
organization which has:

— formulated and established policies and
standards on critical issues such as

independence, auditing and accounting;

— coordinated and reviewed worldwide efforts
for manpower, recruiting, career development,

and continuing education;
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— arranged for the interchange of personnel

among Price Waterhouse firms around the world;

— formulated and disseminated technical and
other professional materials in furtherance

of its worldwide policies and standards;
and

— possibly most significantly, required quality
control reviews of audit practices on a

worldwide basis.

Under the PWI program the

audit practice of each Price Waterhouse office

anywhere in the world is reviewed at least

once every three years either under a firm-

conducted program approved by PWI or by
another Price Waterhouse firm designated

by PWI.

The scope of this program is as

fully comprehensive as that of the review

program recently adopted by the AICPA; its

coverage of practice units is more com
prehensive .
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Each partner of PWI — that is, each individual

partner of each Price Waterhouse firm — is bound to
observe not only the professional standards of the

territory in which he practices, but also the frequently
more demanding international policies and standards

established by PWI.

Moreover, since 1959 it has been

a formal requirement of our international organization
that any examination of financial statements which are

known to be prepared to comply with requirements of
a country other than that in which the firm doing the

work practices, must meet, insofar as practicable, pro

fessional standards and requirements at least as high

as those that prevail in the country where the financial
statements will be used.

These then are the basic elements of the system

we at Price Waterhouse have adopted to ensure the quality

of our practice throughout the world.

It is a system

that we continue to monitor, develop and improve as
the need arises to enable Price Waterhouse firms to
provide one worldwide standard of excellence.

